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ARTICLES
Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision
Making in the Machine-Learning Era
CARY COGLIANESE* AND DAVID LEHR**

Machine-learning algorithms are transforming large segments of the
economy as they fuel innovation in search engines, self-driving cars,
product marketing, and medical imaging, among many other technologies. As machine learning’s use expands across all facets of society,
anxiety has emerged about the intrusion of algorithmic machines into
facets of life previously dependent on human judgment. Alarm bells
sounding over the diffusion of artificial intelligence throughout the private sector only portend greater anxiety about digital robots replacing
humans in the governmental sphere. A few administrative agencies have
already begun to adopt this technology, while others have clear potential
in the near term to use algorithms to shape official decisions over both
rulemaking and adjudication. It is no longer fanciful to envision a future
in which government agencies could effectively make law by robot, a
prospect that understandably conjures up dystopian images of individuals surrendering their liberty to the control of computerized overlords.
Should society be alarmed by governmental use of machine-learning
applications? We examine this question by considering whether the use
of robotic decision tools by government agencies can pass muster under
core, time-honored doctrines of administrative and constitutional law. At
first glance, the idea of algorithmic regulation might appear to offend
one or more traditional doctrines, such as the nondelegation doctrine,
procedural due process, equal protection, or principles of reason-giving
and transparency. We conclude, however, that when machine-learning
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technology is properly understood, its use by government agencies can
comfortably fit within these conventional legal parameters. We recognize,
of course, that the legality of regulation by robot is only one criterion by
which its use should be assessed. Agencies should not apply algorithms
cavalierly, even if doing so might not run afoul of the law; in some cases,
safeguards may be needed for machine learning to satisfy broader,
good-governance aspirations. Yet, in contrast with the emerging alarmism, we resist any categorical dismissal of a future administrative state in
which algorithmic automation guides, and even at times makes, key
decisions. Instead, we urge that governmental reliance on machine learning should be approached with measured optimism about the potential
benefits such technology can offer society by making government smarter
and its decisions more efficient and just.
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INTRODUCTION
Algorithms are not new. For decades, they have served as integral components of every computer program.1 But today, advanced machine-learning
algorithms are creating a vastly automated society, transforming many facets of
life. Many products and services, including email spam filters,2 medical diagnoses,3 product marketing,4 and self-driving cars,5 now depend on machinelearning algorithms and their ability to deliver astonishing forecasting power
and speed. Today’s algorithms are digital “robots”6 that possess effectively
autonomous abilities to adapt and learn.7 As this type of artificial intelligence
becomes more intricately woven into the economy, a new kind of information

1. In the most general of terms, algorithms can be defined as “well-defined set[s] of steps for
accomplishing a certain goal.” Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633,
640 n.14 (2017).
2. See Thiago S. Guzella & Walmir M. Caminhas, A Review of Machine Learning Approaches to
Spam Filtering, 36 EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS 10206 (2009).
3. See W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 432–34 (2015).
4. See Cade Metz, Now Anyone Can Tap the AI Behind Amazon’s Recommendations, WIRED
(Apr. 9, 2015, 8:09 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/now-anyone-can-tap-ai-behind-amazonsrecommendations/ [https://perma.cc/PQ33-JBG2].
5. See Alexis C. Madrigal, The Trick That Makes Google’s Self-Driving Cars Work, ATLANTIC (May
15, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/05/all-the-world-a-track-the-trick-thatmakes-googles-self-driving-cars-work/370871/ [https://perma.cc/XBM4-V7FK].
6. The word “robot” has historically evoked an image of a physical entity directly interacting with
the world, but recent advances in artificial intelligence have expanded that narrow conception of
robotics. Here we primarily discuss virtual robots contained within computer programs, but the
machine-learning algorithms underpinning them also increasingly support the functioning of physical
robots; self-driving cars developed by Google, for instance, can predict the behavior of other cars and
pedestrians on the road using machine learning. Id.
7. The CEO of Nvidia recently stated that “[i]t wasn’t until the last few years that AI could do things
that people can’t do.” Andrew Nusca, The Current State of Artificial Intelligence, According to Nvidia’s
CEO, FORTUNE (Mar. 22, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/22/artificial-intelligence-nvidia/
[https://perma.cc/Q6YJ-LHG6]. He also noted how, over the past two years, the number of companies
using deep learning, a prominent kind of machine learning, has grown thirty-five times larger. Id.
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revolution is beginning that may lead to fundamental changes in society.8 The
ability of increasingly intelligent systems to replace human workers, for instance, has prompted widespread concern about the impact of machine learning
on employment opportunities across a variety of occupational and professional
fields.9 According to some projections, artificial intelligence threatens to displace workers in “all routinized jobs and skill-based jobs that require the ability
to perform diverse kinds of ‘cognitive’ labor, from physicians to reporters to
stockbrokers.”10
Even more ominously, some commentators worry about potentially new
forms of human oppression that could stem from greater reliance on artificial
intelligence. High-tech entrepreneur Elon Musk, for example, has warned that
artificial intelligence presents the “biggest existential threat” to society, likening
it to “summoning the demon.”11 Renowned physicist Stephen Hawking has

8. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM
HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 7 (2013).
9. See generally ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES (2014) (describing how digital technologies
have prompted shifts in employment and life and how individuals can respond to these shifts); TYLER
COWEN, AVERAGE IS OVER: POWERING AMERICA BEYOND THE AGE OF THE GREAT STAGNATION (2013)
(describing recent developments in the labor force and how technology has played into those changes);
MARTIN FORD, RISE OF THE ROBOTS: TECHNOLOGY AND THE THREAT OF A JOBLESS FUTURE (2015); Claire Cain
Miller, As Robots Grow Smarter, American Workers Struggle to Keep Up, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/upshot/as-robots-grow-smarter-american-workers-struggle-to-keepup.html [https://perma.cc/X2X3-3T8V]; Eduardo Porter, Jobs Threatened by Machines: A Once ‘Stupid’ Concern Gains Respect, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/business/
economy/threatened-by-machines-a-once-stupid-concern-gains-respect.html [https://perma.cc/APL46JJH]; Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, Is This Time Different? The Opportunities
and Challenges of Artificial Intelligence, Remarks at AI Now: The Social and Economic Implications of
Artificial Intelligence Technologies in the Near Term (July 7, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/page/files/20160707_cea_ai_furman.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3M8-77QW].
10. JOHN MARKOFF, MACHINES OF LOVING GRACE: THE QUEST FOR COMMON GROUND BETWEEN HUMANS
AND ROBOTS 327 (2015). Debates have begun to emerge over other scenarios made possible by machine
learning, such as a future transportation network that may be based on self-driving cars. See Robert
Hutchinson, Driverless Cars: What Could Possibly Go Wrong?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 15, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/01/driverless-cars-what-could-possibly-go-wrong [https://perma.cc/XJ7U-DQVL];
Claire Cain Miller, If Robots Drove, How Much Safer Would Roads Be?, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/upshot/if-robots-drove-how-much-safer-would-roads-be.html
[https://perma.cc/8NRU-LPJY]; Tom Vanderbilt, Let the Robot Drive: The Autonomous Car of the
Future Is Here, WIRED (Jan. 20, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/01/ff_autonomouscars/all
[https://perma.cc/YGN9-CSAK]. In addition, there is worry that algorithms are serving an inappropriate, editorial role in selecting which news items to display on social media feeds. See Jeffrey Herbst,
The Algorithm Is an Editor, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2016, 6:09 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/thealgorithm-is-an-editor-1460585346 [https://perma.cc/FGW6-3BNF]. Finally, deep concerns about personal privacy have been implicated by increasing reliance on big data analytics; the amount of
potentially personally identifiable information being collected by commercial firms keeps growing
exponentially, and even if this information is maintained by separate entities, new methods of analysis
make it increasingly easy to piece together disparate information to form highly personal portraits. See
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 8, at 152–57.
11. Samuel Gibbs, Elon Musk: Artificial Intelligence Is Our Biggest Existential Threat, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 27, 2014, 6:26 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/27/elon-musk-artificialintelligence-ai-biggest-existential-threat [https://perma.cc/SZD4-7WCL].
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eerily forecasted that “[t]he development of full artificial intelligence could
spell the end of the human race.”12 New York Times reporter John Markoff
summarizes the views of a growing number of observers who worry that
emerging “smart machines” risk constituting a new set of “masters” controlling
humanity.13
These worries about artificial intelligence’s impact on human liberty have
surfaced over the use of machine learning by private-sector institutions such as
banks and media companies, but presumably the prospect of governmental
reliance on autonomous, self-learning robots only magnifies any perceived risks
of digital oppression. Machine learning uses by defense, homeland security, and
criminal law enforcement authorities have understandably begun to trigger
alarm and prompt serious ethical consideration. Waging war through robots, for
example, presents obviously novel concerns.14 The use of algorithms to analyze
telephone records and other personal information has also sparked extensive
public controversy over privacy issues.15 Similar controversies surround law
enforcement agencies’ use of machine learning to detect, respond to, and
perhaps even predict crime.16

12. Rory Cellan-Jones, Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End Mankind, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540 [https://perma.cc/Q4YDZURC].
13. MARKOFF, supra note 10, at iv. One recent book characterizes modern algorithms as “weapons.”
See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND
THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016).
14. See Bill Keller, Opinion, Smart Drones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/03/17/opinion/sunday/keller-smart-drones.html [https://perma.cc/R3N9-ZTUH]; John Markoff,
Fearing Bombs That Can Pick Whom to Kill, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/11/12/science/weapons-directed-by-robots-not-humans-raise-ethical-questions.html [https://perma.
cc/735E-LNZR].
15. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 826 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that the National Security
Agency’s bulk telephone metadata collection exceeded the scope of what Congress had authorized in
the USA PATRIOT Act). On the political debate over national security surveillance, see, for example,
Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and
Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-techgiants-nsa-data [https://perma.cc/XM4Q-QE32]; Andrea Peterson, NSA Reform Bill Passes House,
Despite Loss of Support from Privacy Advocates, WASH. POST (May 22, 2014), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/05/22/nsa-reform-bill-passes-house-despite-loss-ofsupport-from-privacy-advocates/ [https://perma.cc/Z52M-MTBP]. On legal issues raised by post-9/11
governmental surveillance, see, for example, Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE
L.J. 1029 (2004); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the
Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343 (2008).
16. See Steven M. Bellovin et al., When Enough Is Enough: Location Tracking, Mosaic Theory, and
Machine Learning, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 556, 575–76 (2014) (advancing the proposition that the use
of machine learning to infer information about individuals is a new form of privacy invasion that needs
to be squared with the Fourth Amendment). In addition, law enforcement authorities’ increasing use of
machine learning to predict crime—so-called predictive policing—has similarly raised concerns about
racially-biased targeting as well as questions about the very possibility that individuals with a
propensity toward criminality could be identified and punished for crimes that they have not yet
committed. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 8, at 157–63; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,
Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Maurice Chammah with Mark
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Notwithstanding the extensive attention given to the use of machine-learning
algorithms by national security and criminal law enforcement agencies, the use
of such artificial intelligence by other governmental institutions in the day-today operation of government has escaped sustained analysis. Granted, commentators have occasionally speculated about a fanciful future in which institutions
like the Supreme Court17 or the presidency18 might be replaced by artificial
intelligence. But such speculations are usually intended as absurdities. Most
people believe that core governmental institutions and their decisions must be
grounded in judgments made by real human beings: a “government of the
people, by the people.”19 Even if machine-learning algorithms come to be
widely accepted as substitutes for human control over automobiles or other
functions in private life, a deeper, more fundamental suspicion about artificial
intelligence will presumably remain about the use of machine learning in the
governmental sphere. When it comes to making laws and other governmental
decisions, the notion of using algorithms as substitutes for human decisions
would appear to create a serious threat to democratic governance, conjuring
images of unaccountable, computerized overlords.20
And yet, despite dire warnings about the dangers of runaway algorithmic
governance, many aspects of public administration could undoubtedly benefit
from the application of machine-learning algorithms, both today and in years to
come. The vast work of administrative agencies, with their many routine
regulatory responsibilities and adjudicatory processes, would seem ripe to

Hansen, Policing the Future, VERGE (Feb. 3, 2016, 8:01 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/3/
10895804/st-louis-police-hunchlab-predictive-policing-marshall-project [https://perma.cc/2T87VJCQ]; Matt Stroud, The Minority Report: Chicago’s New Police Computer Predicts Crimes, But Is It
Racist?, VERGE (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/2/19/5419854/the-minorityreport-this-computer-predicts-crime-but-is-it-racist [https://perma.cc/NX4G-5A99]; see also Maria Konnikova, The Future of Fraud-Busting, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2016/03/the-future-of-fraud-busting/426867/ [https://perma.cc/6CQM-X8QH] (discussing use
of predictive analytics to identify future “con artists, and then interven[ing] before they cause trouble”).
There have also been worries that current Fourth Amendment doctrine may be ill-equipped to handle
law enforcement’s prediction of criminal activity using machine learning. See, e.g., Michael L. Rich,
Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
871 (2016).
17. Sean Braswell, All Rise for Chief Justice Robot!, OZY (June 7, 2015), http://www.ozy.com/
immodest-proposal/all-rise-for-chief-justice-robot/41131 [https://perma.cc/G86F-9WYP].
18. Maureen Dowd, Beware Our Mind Children, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/04/26/opinion/sunday/maureen-dowd-beware-our-mind-children.html [https://perma.cc/NK4G4896] (“Can [Alex Garland] envision an A.I. president, even more sleek and less emotive than the one
we have now? ‘There could be an A.I. president; there could,’ he replies.”); Studio 360: The Computer
as Artist, WNYC RADIO & PRI (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.wnyc.org/story/the-computer-as-artist/
[https://perma.cc/LEK8-GTWE] (stating that his so-called “creativity machine,” an artificial intelligence system, should be used “in the White House”).
19. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
20. Cf. Ed Felten, Accountable Algorithms, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Sept. 12, 2012), https://freedom-totinker.com/2012/09/12/accountable-algorithms/ [https://perma.cc/TV9N-CGYA] (describing how the
use of algorithmic decision making in lieu of human decision making may necessitate making these
algorithms more technically accountable).
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benefit from such automation. These agencies fulfill important oversight responsibilities over vital aspects of everyday life, from regulating the safety of the
food we eat to setting the rules by which financial markets operate. Officials in
these agencies must make an array of crucial judgments on a daily basis that are
not unlike the kinds of judgments that machine learning has so clearly helped
improve in the private sector.21 Moreover, with the private sector increasingly
relying on algorithms to make faster, more precise decisions, the increased
speed and complexity of economic activity in the machine-learning era surely
demands that government agencies keep pace and make use of the same
analytic tools in order to regulate the private sector more effectively.22 If
machine learning can help regulatory agencies make smarter, more accurate
decisions, the benefits to society could be considerable.
But can the prospect of the government regulating by robot, or adjudicating
by algorithm, be accommodated within prevailing legal norms? Fitting machine
learning into the regulatory state may turn out to be one of the most fundamental challenges facing the U.S. governmental system in the decades to come.
Regulating by robot would hardly seem, at first glance, to fit naturally within
prevailing principles of administrative law. That law, after all, is built on the
assumption that governmental decisions will be made by humans. Such an
assumption has led to a variety of legal constraints aimed at ensuring administrative decisions are democratically accountable and fair. Indeed, even with humans at the helm, administrative agencies are already thought to constitute a
vast bureaucratic “machinery” of government with an ever-present potential to
grow detached from and unaccountable to the rest of society.23 If many bureaucrats’ jobs come to be replaced by automated systems, the likelihood of an even
more detached, possibly despotic, administrative government would only seem
to increase.24

21. See supra notes 2–7.
22. Cary Coglianese, Optimizing Government for an Optimizing Economy, in SECTION 8:
POLITICS, NEW ENTREPRENEURIAL GROWTH AGENDA (2016), http://www.kauffman.org/neg/section-8#
optimizinggovernmentforanoptimizingeconomy [https://perma.cc/EUK2-EYSR]. Governments themselves are increasingly recognizing the need to oversee artificial intelligence itself. For example, the
UK’s House of Commons Science and Technology Committee recently launched an inquiry into “the
social, legal, and ethical issues raised by developments of . . . artificial intelligence.” Science and
Technology Committee (Commons), Robotics and Artificial Intelligence Inquiry Launched, U.K.
PARLIAMENT (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commonsselect/science-and-technology-committee/news-parliament-2015/robotics-and-artificial-intelligenceinquiry-launch-15-16/ [https://perma.cc/VQ49-9VQM]. Also, the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy hosted a series of public workshops in 2016 about the risks of machine learning,
including its uses in government. Ed Felten, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (May 3, 2016, 3:01 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/05/03/preparing-futureartificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/3G6G-KRZF].
23. See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
24. Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010) (“The
diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability.”).
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When contemplating the use of robotic algorithms, public officials, lawyers,
and judges should ask how well the use of machine learning will conform to
well-established legal principles of constitutional and administrative law. In this
Article, we address significant but previously unanalyzed legal questions raised
by machine learning. In particular, we consider how nonhuman decision tools
would have to be used to comport with the nondelegation doctrine and with
rules about due process, antidiscrimination, and governmental transparency.
Although administrative agencies are still only beginning to use machinelearning algorithms, today’s widespread concern about the robotic control of
other facets of life makes it opportune to examine carefully the potential for
machine learning’s use by government agencies.25
Given the relative complexity of modern machine-learning algorithms, we
begin in Part I by providing a brief, non-technical summary of how these
algorithms operate. Drawing on this background, we also identify existing and
likely future applications of machine learning within the administrative state. In
Part II, we provide a legal analysis of such algorithmic applications by federal
administrative agencies, considering whether various methods of implementing
machine learning will likely offend principles of nondelegation, due process,
antidiscrimination, and transparency. We conclude that government agencies
should be able to rely on autonomous, learning decision tools without running
afoul of legal standards. Contrary to popular perceptions, machine learning will
not lead to a runaway government, as a series of technical limitations preclude a
future in which complete regulatory or adjudicatory power can be ceded to
autonomous algorithms over which humans exert little control. When used
thoughtfully, these machine-learning applications should not offend the core
legal foundations of the regulatory state.

25. We know of no other work of scholarship that comprehensively analyzes the constitutional and
administrative law issues implicated by machine learning in the regulatory state. Admittedly, for more
than a decade it has been clear that “many possibilities exist for applying information technologies in
new ways to government rulemaking.” Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: Information Technology and
the Regulatory Process, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 369 (2004). A few scholars have recently identified
ways that machine learning could be used by regulatory agencies to improve regulatory outcomes. See
Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards (Univ. of Chicago Public Law
Working Paper No. 550, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract⫽2693826 [https://perma.cc/9YDG-RBRC]
(noting how agencies may implement machine learning to let entities know whether their discrete
actions would be aligned with broad legislatively-established standards); Joshua Mitts, Predictive
Regulation (June 27, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract⫽2411816 [https://perma.
cc/GVU5-VU5D] (discussing the use of machine learning to identify market trends indicating future
need for regulation). Moreover, some recent or forthcoming papers provide some initial consideration
of accountability or fairness issues related to the use of algorithms, broadly defined, across a range of
decision-making settings. See, e.g., Kroll et al., supra note 1 (briefly taking up machine-learning
algorithms in the context of discrimination, but mainly focusing on algorithms more generally);
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Cyberdelegation and the Administrative State 1 (Stanford Public Law
Working Paper No. 2754385, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract⫽2754385 [https://perma.cc/3EYG62WJ]) (exploring “some of the questions and trade-offs associated with delegating administrative
agency decisions to computer algorithms”).

2017]

REGULATING BY ROBOT

1155

After analyzing the administrative law implications of machine learning, we
step back in Part III to reflect on the policy merits of applying machine learning
to administrative tasks. We do recognize that machine learning could be implemented irresponsibly in ways that, even though legal, might still offend more
conventional notions of good government.26 As with any tool, artificial intelligence could be misused. And by no means should anyone think that machine
learning constitutes a panacea for government. The use of machine learning in
specific settings and for particular purposes may well prove inadvisable once all
things are considered. The way algorithms are used will matter too, and at times
some safeguards may need to be implemented to ensure consonance with the
broader purposes standing behind the administrative law doctrines we consider
here. In general, though, governmental decision making in the machine-learning
era can and, in appropriate circumstances, should take advantage of the enhanced public value that can be achieved from regulating by robot and adjudicating by algorithm. Our detailed examination of the legal issues and policy
tradeoffs leads us to be reasonably optimistic about machine learning and the
instrumental role it can play in making a more promising future for administrative government.
I. MACHINE LEARNING AND ITS ADMINISTRATIVE APPLICATIONS
Some of the most prominent examples of private-sector growth today—from
Amazon27 to Zillow28—depend on the use of machine learning to optimize
production processes, supply chains, marketing, and the pricing of goods and
services. Machine learning undergirds future growth across a wide range of
sectors, from the introduction of “fintech” firms in the financial industry29 to
advances in healthcare delivery via precision medicine.30 Machine learning’s
main attraction stems from how well it “outperforms human intelligence.”31 As

26. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013)
(describing conventions and norms surrounding the administrative state, particularly agency
independence).
27. See Metz, supra note 4 (describing Amazon’s use of machine learning to recommend products to
consumers).
28. See Jessica Davis, Zillow Uses Analytics, Machine Learning to Disrupt with Data, INFORMATIONWEEK (Oct. 14, 2016, 11:06 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/big-data/zillow-uses-analyticsmachine-learning-to-disrupt-with-data/d/d-id/1327175 [https://perma.cc/8UTD-QX6S] (describing
Zillow’s use of machine learning to provide forecasts of housing prices).
29. See Falguni Desai, The Age of Artificial Intelligence in Fintech, FORBES (June 30, 2016, 10:42
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/falgunidesai/2016/06/30/the-age-of-artificial-intelligence-in-fintech
[https://perma.cc/EK89-DD3Y] (describing how fintech firms use artificial intelligence to improve
investment strategies and analyze consumer financial activity).
30. For a discussion of these and other examples of an increasingly optimizing economy, see
Coglianese, supra note 22.
31. NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 11 (2014). Of note, machine
learning recently bested human intelligence in the incredibly complex game of Go. See David Silver
et al., Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural Networks and Tree Search, 529 NATURE 484, 484
(2016).
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private firms pursue significant efficiency gains through the kind of smarter and
more contextualized decisions made possible by algorithmic analysis of big
data, the government will undoubtedly need to follow suit, not merely to keep
up with new risks these private-sector uses of machine learning might bring, but
also to improve government’s ability to address a host of existing risks and
regulatory problems.32 Machine learning promises to make the government, like
the private sector, smarter and more efficient. In this Part, we introduce machine
learning and discuss how government agencies are already beginning to explore
its use to optimize administrative tasks, an endeavor that is likely to grow both
in size and scope in the years ahead. We first explain what machine learning is
and describe its distinguishing features. We then discuss how agencies are
already using machine learning. Finally, we show how this technology could, in
the future, potentially transform the administrative state through what we call
“rulemaking by robot” and “adjudicating by algorithm.”
A. WHAT IS MACHINE LEARNING?

Fundamentally, machine-learning algorithms are used to make predictions.
This emphasis on prediction contrasts markedly with traditional statistical
techniques which seek to model underlying data-generating processes in the real
world. Although traditional statistical techniques can also generate predictions,
they do so only when the model created by the analyst fits well with the
underlying processes being modeled. These traditional techniques require the
analyst first to specify a mathematical equation expressing an outcome variable
as a function of selected explanatory variables put together in a particular way,
and then to see how well the data fit with the analyst’s choices. For example,
when analysts employ the traditional techniques of ordinary least squares
regression or logistic regression, they specify equations that represent their a
priori beliefs about the functional relationships that exist between independent
(or explanatory) and dependent (or outcome) variables. What regression does,
in essence, is estimate the magnitude and direction of these relationships
between the two types of variables that are selected and specified by the analyst.
The relationships in the statistical model ostensibly represent the relationships
in the real world, which is why regression results are often used to support
causal inferences.
By contrast, machine learning is nonparametric in that it does not require the
researcher to specify any particular functional form of a mathematical model in
advance. Instead, these algorithms allow the data themselves to dictate how
information contained in input variables is put together to forecast the value of

32. See Coglianese, supra note 22. A senior strategist at the National Security Agency has noted how
advanced analytic techniques are particularly essential for agencies that will soon be forced “to operate
at cyberspeed and at scale.” GOV’T BUS. COUNCIL, GOV’T EXEC. MEDIA GRP., DATA ANALYTICS: A
STRATEGIC ASSET TO GOVERNMENT 2 (2015), http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/2015-09-03_qlik_
issue_brief_designed_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY76-FY5V].
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an output variable.33 Machine-learning algorithms do not generate quite the
same kind of information on the magnitude or direction of the effects that might
be associated with any single input variable on the output variable, controlling
for the other variables. The functional relationships in machine learning are not
necessarily the complete set of those in nature’s true data-generating process. As
a result, no claim can be made that the machine-learning process represents any
set of true relationships in the world, and thus none of the causal inferences that
typically characterize statistical modeling can be applied to results of machine
learning. In short, with machine-learning results, causal relationships between
inputs and outputs may simply not exist, no matter how intuitive such relationships might look on the surface. If a machine-learning algorithm tends to
forecast that older individuals commit fewer crimes than younger individuals,
for example, it cannot be claimed on the basis of the machine-learning process
that older age causes any reduction in the propensity to commit crimes.34
Nevertheless, from a technical standpoint, machine learning’s distinctive
predictive and nonparametric focus turns out to be paramount to its impressive
usefulness in generating reliable forecasts. Also of central importance, and what
gives machine learning its name, is how such algorithms mathematically “learn”
to generate their predictions. There are many machine-learning algorithms that
do so in different mathematical ways, but they all attempt, as one textbook
explains, to “optimize a performance criterion using example data or past
experience.”35 In other words, these algorithms make repeated passes through
data sets, progressively modifying or averaging their predictions to optimize
specified criteria.
To illustrate this functioning, consider a common application of machine
learning that has proven critical to improvements in the government’s handling
of postal mail and other paperwork-processing tasks—the recognition and
classification of handwritten digits.36 In this simple application, an algorithm’s
performance criterion, or objective function, is classification accuracy—that is,
how often it correctly recognizes, say, a handwritten number two as a two. To

33. See RICHARD A. BERK, STATISTICAL LEARNING FROM A REGRESSION PERSPECTIVE 13 (2008).
34. For a discussion of the inferential value of outputs from machine-learning algorithms, see id. at
9–17.
35. ETHEM ALPAYDIN, INTRODUCTION TO MACHINE LEARNING 3 (2d ed. 2010). In the broader field, the
varied types of machine learning are referred to by a dizzying array of different terms, some technical,
some colloquial, for example: smart machines, expert systems, neural networks, deep learning, hierarchical learning, reinforcement learning, structured learning, and more. Although we explain some of these
different terms in this Part, for the most part throughout this Article we use the terms “machine
learning,” “algorithms,” and “artificial intelligence” for convenience to capture all possible variations in
terms, as we are concerned primarily with the legal issues surrounding the general use of this family of
techniques.
36. See, e.g., Cheng-Lin Liu et al., Handwritten Digit Recognition: Benchmarking of State-of-theArt Techniques, 36 PATTERN RECOGNITION 2271 (2003); Y. LeCun et al., Comparison of Learning
Algorithms for Handwritten Digit Recognition, Presented at the International Conference on Artificial
Neural Networks (1995), http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/publis/pdf/lecun-95b.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NGQ85FS].

1158

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 105:1147

perform this classification, an algorithm must “learn” what aspects of a handwritten digit make it likely to be a two. Over the course of iterative passes through
the data, such an algorithm tries to use many different mathematical descriptions of shapes, as well as relationships of shapes, in the pictures of handwritten
digits to make its classifications. If a particular descriptive method is optimal,
the algorithm will be “rewarded” with a low error rate; if the descriptions are
not optimal, the algorithm will be “punished” with a high error rate. It can learn,
for example, that a handwritten digit is likely to be a two if the topmost section
of the digit depicted is semicircular and facing downward. Ultimately, the
algorithm will seek to make classifications based on mathematical descriptions
of shapes that yield the lowest error rates.37
This handwriting recognition example provides an illustration of machinelearning algorithms applied to classification problems, where the goal is to sort
objects into classes. But classification problems represent only some of the
diverse applications of machine-learning techniques. Machine-learning algorithms can also be used to predict numerical values, such as house prices or
stock market index values—endeavors that are often termed regression problems.38 They also can be applied to scenarios, such as playing chess, where an
algorithm can be used to determine the optimal sequence of actions.39 Variety in
the types of machine-learning algorithms means that they can be used in a wide
variety of predictive endeavors.
Admittedly, many “non-learning” techniques have long been used to pursue
these same endeavors. For example, ordinary least squares regression can
estimate numerical outcomes, and logistic regression is commonly used as a
binary classifier. Given the existence of these alternative statistical techniques,
what advantages do machine-learning algorithms offer? Put simply, they outperform standard procedures in terms of predictive accuracy and statistical efficiency (that is, the increased ability to obtain predictions with both low bias and
low variance).40 Furthermore, many phenomena that analysts want to forecast

37. This is an example of supervised machine learning, where each handwritten digit is labeled with
its correct digit so that the algorithm knows when it is making errors. Unsupervised learning uses
unlabeled data, so that performance criteria being optimized are not measures of error rates, because the
truth is not known, but measures of similarity between digits determined by the algorithm to be the
same. See ALPAYDIN, supra note 35, at 11–13.
38. See id. at 9–11.
39. See id. at 13–14; see also Cade Metz, In a Huge Breakthrough, Google’s AI Beats a Top Player
at the Game of Go, WIRED (Jan. 27, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2016/01/in-a-hugebreakthrough-googles-ai-beats-a-top-player-at-the-game-of-go/ [https://perma.cc/9YQ9-LHM4].
40. These benefits result from the mathematical techniques of boosting or bagging (or both). For
demonstrations of these benefits resulting from boosting, see Robert E. Schapire, The Boosting
Approach to Machine Learning: An Overview, Presented at the MSRI Workshop on Nonlinear
Estimation and Classification (2002), https://www.cs.princeton.edu/picasso/mats/schapire02boosting_
schapire.pdf [https://perma.cc/64PZ-PY57]. For an illustration of similar benefits resulting from bagging, see Leo Breiman, Some Infinity Theory for Predictor Ensembles (U.C. Berkeley Technical Report
577, 2000), https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/breiman/some_theory2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ3DRWMY]; Peter Bühlmann & Bin Yu, Explaining Bagging, Presented at the Seminar für Statistik (2000),
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are extraordinarily complex, and analysts often lack the a priori knowledge
necessary to specify an accurately forecasting conventional model. By eschewing this dependency on existing knowledge and the need to identify the functional form of any relationships, machine learning can apply to a wider range of
problems and yield vastly enhanced accuracy over its alternatives, whether
human intuition, expert judgment, or traditional statistical techniques.41 Learning algorithms can also adapt more dynamically; as new data become available,
they can search for new patterns and thereby improve forecasting accuracy.
Although machine-learning algorithms are known and prized for their accuracy, this benefit does come at an interpretive cost. This cost is frequently
invoked by references to machine-learning algorithms as “black-box” procedures.42 The black-box nature of machine learning holds important implications
for administrative law, so to understand this feature of machine learning consider again the classification of handwritten digits. We said that an algorithm
might learn that certain geometric characteristics of the shapes of handwritten
digits are useful for determining which digits they represent—yet we cannot
really know what precise characteristics any machine-learning algorithm is
keying in on. Machine-learning algorithms transform a series of inputs to a
series of outputs by optimizing a performance criterion, but that is where the
analyst’s easy ability to interpret the algorithms’ workings comes to an end. The
user of an algorithm cannot really discern which particular relationships between variables factor into the algorithm’s classification, or at which point in the
algorithm they do, nor can the user determine how exactly the algorithm puts
together various relationships to yield its classifications.43 For this reason,
machine-learning algorithms are often described as transforming inputs to
outputs through a black box. An analyst cannot look inside the black box to
understand how that transformation occurs or describe the relationships with the
same intuitive and causal language often applied to traditional statistical

http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:23905/eth-23905-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPE2-QEAF]. For
a demonstration of the benefits resulting from combined classifiers achieved through both bagging and
boosting, see V. Koltchinskii & D. Panchenko, Empirical Margin Distributions and Bounding the
Generalization Error of Combined Classifiers, 30 ANNALS STAT. 1 (2002).
41. See, e.g., Volodymyr Mnih et al., Human-Level Control Through Deep Reinforcement Learning,
518 NATURE 529, 529 (2015); Kaiming He et al., Delving Deep into Rectifiers: Surpassing HumanLevel Performance on ImageNet Classification, Presented at the IEEE International Conference on
Computer Vision (2015), http://arxiv.org/abs/1502.01852 [https://perma.cc/5ERE-L2HK]; Bo Pang et
al., Thumbs Up? Sentiment Classification Using Machine Learning Techniques, Presented at the
Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (2002), http://www.cs.cornell.edu/
home/llee/papers/sentiment.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4VS-XYM2].
42. See, e.g., Leo Breiman, Statistical Modeling: The Two Cultures, 16 STAT. SCI. 199, 199 (2001).
43. For example, a common machine-learning algorithm known as random forests generates its
predictions by, roughly speaking, producing thousands of decision trees (called classification or
regression trees) and then averaging predictions across all trees. See Leo Breiman, Random Forests, 45
MACHINE LEARNING 5, 5 (2001). The analyst can examine the structure of a particular tree and determine
to some extent how variables and interactions between variables functionally affect the predictions, but
this will tell the analyst nothing about all such processes in the forest as a whole.
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modeling.44
Despite this interpretive limitation, machine-learning algorithms have been
implemented widely in private-sector settings. Companies desire the savings in
costs and efficiency gleaned from these techniques, and the lack of intuitive
interpretability is of little concern in endeavors where accuracy, not causality, is
the valued metric. Netflix, for instance, employs a form of machine learning
called “artificial neural networks” to suggest entertainment options to its customers based on their prior viewing habits.45 Google uses machine learning to
identify house numbers in its Street View imagery,46 to save energy in its data
centers,47 and to keep its self-driving cars from crashing.48 Machine learning
has also shown great utility in the financial sector, where it is employed to
predict the value of investments and financial instruments.49 The benefits of
learning algorithms have also promoted their adoption in academic research in
disciplines closely connected to policymaking, where predictive accuracy is
critical. For example, researchers have shown that machine-learning algorithms
can help predict the propensity of probationers and parolees to commit violent
crimes,50 estimate population densities of homeless persons in cities,51 and
forecast student retention at universities.52 In these ways, both private businesses and academic researchers have embraced machine learning, and machinelearning applications in a wide variety of settings are already actively shaping
society.
B. EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE APPLICATIONS

For much the same reason that machine learning has been exploited in the
private sector, its use holds potentially great value to government agencies. We

44. See Breiman, supra note 42, at 199–200.
45. Alex Chen et al., Distributed Neural Networks with GPUs in the AWS Cloud, NETFLIX TECH BLOG
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://techblog.netflix.com/2014/02/distributed-neural-networks-with-gpus.html [https://
perma.cc/T7CR-7QGM].
46. Ian J. Goodfellow et al., Multi-Digit Number Recognition from Street View Imagery Using Deep
Convolutional Neural Networks, CORNELL UNIV. LIB. COMP. VISION & PATTERN RECOGNITION (2013),
http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6082 [https://perma.cc/H7KK-DZJT].
47. Joe Kava, Better Data Centers Through Machine Learning, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (May 28,
2014), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/better-data-centers-through-machine.html [https://perma.
cc/ZEP4-2Z8M].
48. See Madrigal, supra note 5.
49. See Quentin Hardy, Wealth Managers Enlist Spy Tools to Map Portfolios, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 3,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/technology/wealth-managers-enlist-spy-tools-to-mapportfolios.html [https://perma.cc/K4F4-VZEE]; see also MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET
REVOLT 36 (2014).
50. See, e.g., Richard Berk et al., Forecasting Murder Within a Population of Probationers and
Parolees: A High Stakes Application of Statistical Learning, 172 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y SERIES A (STAT. IN
SOC’Y) 191 (2009).
51. See, e.g., Brian Kriegler & Richard Berk, Small Area Estimation of the Homeless in Los Angeles:
An Application of Cost-Sensitive Stochastic Gradient Boosting, 4 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 1234 (2010).
52. See, e.g., Dursun Delen, A Comparative Analysis of Machine Learning Techniques for Student
Retention Management, 49 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 498 (2010).
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have already noted that national security and law enforcement agencies are
starting to rely on machine learning to support functions as varied as assessing
risks of street crime and automating weapons delivery systems. Outside the
security and law enforcement context, other government agencies have also
begun to explore uses of machine learning, revealing growing recognition of its
promise across a variety of policy settings and at all levels of government.53
Although we mainly focus in this Article on the use of machine learning by
the federal government, the nation’s largest cities have received much attention
so far for their embrace of machine learning and its potential to improve
governmental efficiency and effectiveness.54 The City of Chicago, for example,
has established an award-winning SmartData Platform initiative through which
city officials are using machine learning to support a range of city services,
from identifying restaurants that should be inspected55 to predicting where and
when rodent control bait should be placed throughout the city.56 New York City
has established a Mayor’s Office of Data Analytics,57 which, among other
things, is working with the city’s fire department to use machine learning to
decide where to send building inspectors.58 Flint, Michigan has partnered with
Google and the University of Michigan to address its recent water crisis by
targeting pipe replacements based on machine-learning predictions of lead
contamination.59 The City of Los Angeles has installed sensors in all of its
streets that continuously feed data into a machine-learning system that automatically determines when traffic signals should turn red or green to optimize traffic

53. Although outside our scope, we note that courts are also increasingly looking to machine
learning as a tool for discovery in the litigation process. See, e.g., Wallis M. Hampton, Predictive
Coding: It’s Here to Stay, SKADDEN (May 5, 2014), https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/
publications/LIT_JuneJuly14_EDiscoveryBulletin.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WHG-ZLKF] (noting courts’
increasing interest in and favorable inclination toward the use of machine learning to assist in
e-discovery).
54. See, e.g., STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & SUSAN CRAWFORD, THE RESPONSIVE CITY: ENGAGING COMMUNITIES
THROUGH DATA-SMART GOVERNANCE (2014); Bechara Choucair, Jay Bhatt & Raed Mansour, How Cities
Are Using Analytics to Improve Public Health, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 15, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/09/
how-cities-are-using-analytics-to-improve-public-health/ [https://perma.cc/R26N-7RU2].
55. Nick Rojas, Chicago and Big Data, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 22, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/10/
22/chicago-and-big-data/ [https://perma.cc/P47F-9JKV]; see also Edward L. Glaeser et al., Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 114,
114 (2016). Interestingly, similar restaurant hygiene algorithms deployed in Boston were developed via
crowdsourcing, a potentially cost-effective alternative to private contracting in certain situations. Id.
56. Ash Center Mayors Challenge Research Team, Chicago’s SmartData Platform: Pioneering Open
Source Municipal Analytics, DATA-SMART CITY SOLUTIONS (Jan. 8, 2014), http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/
news/article/chicago-mayors-challenge-367 [https://perma.cc/MY8X-PDD6].
57. THE MAYOR’S OFFICE OF DATA ANALYTICS, CITY OF NEW YORK, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/analytics/
index.page [https://perma.cc/4QTF-M3UL].
58. Brian Heaton, New York City Fights Fire with Data, GOV’T TECH. (May 15, 2015), http://www.
govtech.com/public-safety/New-York-City-Fights-Fire-with-Data.html [https://perma.cc/XG7W5UYH].
59. Gabe Cherry, Google, U-M to Build Digital Tools for Flint Water Crisis, U. MICH. NEWS (May 3,
2016), http://ns.umich.edu/new/multimedia/videos/23780-google-u-m-to-build-digital-tools-for-flintwater-crisis [https://perma.cc/GV4C-LR6N].
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flow.60
At the federal level, one of the earliest domestic applications of machine
learning came from, as we already noted, the U.S. Postal Service’s need for a
method to sort mail automatically by predicting the zip codes written on
envelopes.61 Meteorologists within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration have explored the use of machine learning to improve forecasts of
severe weather events.62 Other federal agencies have also started to rely on
machine learning to support various regulatory and administrative activities.63
Analysts at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example,
have developed a program called ToxCast to help the agency predict toxicities
of chemical compounds.64 Chemical toxicity has traditionally been established
using animal testing, but these laboratory techniques are costly and time consuming, not to mention often harmful to animals. Faced with tens of thousands of
chemicals that could be potentially subject to EPA regulation, the agency
developed ToxCast to prioritize which of the multitude of chemicals in production should undergo more in-depth testing. ToxCast applies machine-learning
algorithms—specifically, linear discriminant analysis—to data on chemicals’
interactions obtained from in vitro testing to predict their toxicities.65 In one
60. Ian Lovett, To Fight Gridlock, Los Angeles Synchronizes Every Red Light, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/us/to-fight-gridlock-los-angeles-synchronizes-every-red-light.
html [https://perma.cc/25T2-DCFG]; David Z. Morris, How Swarming Traffic Lights Could Save
Drivers Billions of Dollars, FORTUNE (July 13, 2015, 4:47 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/07/13/swarmingtraffic-lights [https://perma.cc/KP8C-N88S].
61. By 1988, USPS contractors had developed one of the first methods for extracting visual images
from envelopes and compiling them into an analyzable data set. See Ching-Huei Wang & Sargur N.
Srihari, A Framework for Object Recognition in a Visually Complex Environment and Its Application to
Locating Address Blocks on Mail Pieces, 2 INT’L J. COMP. VISION 125, 125 (1988). This data set then
enabled the development of early algorithms analyzing handwritten zip codes. See O. Matan et al.,
Handwritten Character Recognition Using Neural Network Architectures, Presented at the 4th USPS
Advanced Technology Conference (1990), http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/publis/pdf/matan-90.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P4LS-5HZH].
62. David John Gagne II et al., Day-Ahead Hail Prediction Integrating Machine Learning with
Storm-Scale Numerical Weather Models, Presented at the Twenty-Seventh Conference on Innovative
Applications of Artificial Intelligence (2015), http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/IAAI/IAAI15/paper/
view/9724/9898 [https://perma.cc/ZZ97-3UCJ].
63. More than a decade ago, the General Accountability Office surveyed 128 federal agencies and
found that fifty-two of them were engaged in “data mining” activities, defined broadly “as the
application of database technology and techniques—such as statistical analysis and modeling—to
uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that allow for the prediction
of future results.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A
WIDE RANGE OF USES 4 (2004). It is not clear from the report how many of these efforts involved
machine-learning techniques as opposed to more traditional statistical methods. We know of no
comparable effort to survey agencies across government about their use of machine learning.
64. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TOXCAST FACT SHEET (2013), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2013-12/documents/toxcast-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3UU-YL4X].
65. Robert Kavlock et al., Update on EPA’s ToxCast Program: Providing High Throughput Decision
Support Tools for Chemical Risk Management, 25 CHEMISTRY RES. TOXICOLOGY 1287, 1295 (2012). On
the use of machine learning in toxicology, see Huanxiang Liu, Xiaojun Yao & Paola Gramatica, The
Applications of Machine Learning Algorithms in the Modeling of Estrogen-Like Chemicals, 12 COMBINATORIAL CHEM. & HIGH THROUGHPUT SCREENING 490 (2009).
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application during ToxCast’s first phase, analysts estimated that using machine
learning could save the government $980,000 per toxic chemical positively
identified.66 Although the EPA presently uses ToxCast to identify chemicals for
additional testing through more traditional means, its underlying predictive
approach could eventually form an independent basis for justifying the imposition of regulatory controls.67
The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has also used machine-learning
algorithms to aid its auditing and enforcement functions. In 2001, it began
developing a “risk-based collection model” that prioritized the IRS’s collection
cases for small businesses and self-employed taxpayers by using machinelearning algorithms, including neural networks, to predict risk of nonpayment.68
In that same year, the agency began to use support vector machines, another
type of machine-learning algorithm, to predict abuse and fraud in tax returns
and to allocate cases for human review based on the probability of abuse and
the magnitude of the dollar amount of the abuse.69 More recently, in 2009, the
IRS launched an Information Reporting and Document Matching program,
which applies algorithms to credit card and other third-party data to predict tax
underreporting and non-filing by businesses.70 The IRS increased its requested
funding for enforcement targeting from $1.4 million in 201271 to over $39
million in 2016,72 specifically to develop better ways to use machine-learning
algorithms, including neural networks, to “identify emerging areas of
non-compliance.”73

66. Matthew T. Martin et al., Economic Benefits of Using Adaptive Predictive Models of Reproductive Toxicity in the Context of a Tiered Testing Program, 58 SYS. BIOLOGY REPROD. MED. 3, 4–6 (2012).
67. Richard S. Judson et al., Estimating Toxicity-Related Biological Pathway Altering Doses for
High-Throughput Chemical Risk Assessment, 24 CHEM. RES. TOXICOLOGY 451, 457–60 (2011).
68. Jane Martin & Rick Stephenson, Risk-Based Collection Model Development and Testing,
Presented at the Internal Revenue Service Research Conference (2005), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/
05stephenson.pdf [https://perma.cc/M65K-D9D7].
69. David DeBarr & Maury Harwood, Relational Mining for Compliance Risk, Presented at the
Internal Revenue Service Research Conference (2004), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04debarr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y9F8-RWNK].
70. See CHRIS WAGNER ET AL., TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., IRS Policy Implementation Through Systems
Programming Lacks Transparency and Precludes Adequate Review, in 2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 71, 76, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2010arcmsp5_policythruprogramming.pdf [https://perma.
cc/3DHR-ZXAT]. Interestingly, this program was temporarily halted in 2014 not because of issues with
its predictive algorithms, but due to continued reliance on human tax examiners; the Automated
Underreporter System that predicts underreporting was successfully deployed, but the Case Management System that then handed flagged cases to humans for further examination did not meet technical
requirements. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2014-20-088, THE INFORMATION REPORTING
AND DOCUMENT MATCHING CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM COULD NOT BE DEPLOYED (2014), https://www.
treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2014reports/201420088fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3CS-VLEL].
71. U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FY 2012 BUDGET REQUEST 63 (2011), https://www.treasury.gov/about/
budget-performance/Documents/CJ_FY2012_IRS_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB72-GXW5].
72. U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FY 2016 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET 88 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/
about/budget-performance/CJ16/02-06.%20IRS%20FY%202016%20CJ.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BXVDPFQ].
73. U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 71, at 63.
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In addition to the EPA’s and the IRS’s use of machine learning, the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) has conducted research on the use of machinelearning techniques to extract information about known equipment failures,
errors, or other adverse events from medical device reports.74 This safety
agency is also currently engaged in a five-year collaborative research agreement
with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) focusing on “artificial
intelligence, advanced statistical machine learning and data mining methods.”75
MIT researchers have also recently collaborated with researchers at the U.S.
Department of the Treasury’s Office of Financial Research (OFR) to survey
methods of evaluating systemic risk in consumer credit markets, including the
use of classification and regression trees.76 Separately, academic researchers
have demonstrated how machine-learning algorithms can be used to predict
cases of financial statement fraud,77 electoral fraud,78 and even illegal fishing
practices.79 Agencies like the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have also taken note of these new
approaches to fraud detection.80
For machine-learning algorithms to work, they depend on accessible and
analyzable data. Toward that end, many agencies are beginning to recognize the
importance of so-called big data—or large volumes of information—in ways

74. Commissioner’s Fellowship Program: Final Report Abstracts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WorkingatFDA/FellowshipInternshipGraduateFacultyPrograms/
CommissionersFellowshipProgram/ucm413253.htm [https://perma.cc/67MG-UXJL]. Work by the
same researcher has similarly used machine-learning algorithms to extract laboratory test information from FDA decision summaries of device premarket notifications. Yanna Shen Kang & Mehmet
Kayaalp, Extracting Laboratory Test Information from Biomedical Text, 4 J. PATHOL. INFORM. 23
(2013).
75. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOU 225-12-0010, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION AND MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (2012),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/MemorandaofUnderstandingMOUs/Academia
MOUs/ucm318476.htm [https://perma.cc/DUA8-9KM4].
76. For the research surveyed, see Amir E. Khandani et al., Consumer Credit Risk Models via
Machine-Learning Algorithms, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2767 (2010).
77. See, e.g., Johan Perols, Financial Statement Fraud Detection: An Analysis of Statistical and
Machine Learning Algorithms, 30 AUDITING 19 (2011).
78. Francisco Cantu & Sebastian M. Saiegh, A Supervised Machine Learning Procedure to Detect
Electoral Fraud Using Digital Analysis (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Working Paper No.
11, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract⫽1594406 [https://perma.cc/NSJ2-9FD9].
79. Cleridy E. Lennert-Cody & Richard A. Berk, Statistical Learning Procedures for Monitoring
Regulatory Compliance: An Application to Fisheries Data, 170 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y SERIES A (STAT. IN
SOC’Y) 671 (2007); see also Richard Berk, Forecasting Consumer Safety Violations and Violators, in
IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 131, 135–36 (Cary Coglianese, Adam
M. Finkel & David Zaring eds., 2009).
80. See, e.g., Scott W. Bauguess, Deputy Chief Economist, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Hope
and Limitations of Machine Learning in Market Risk Assessment (Mar. 6, 2015), http://cfe.columbia.edu/
files/seasieor/center-financial-engineering/presentations/MachineLearningSECRiskAssessment030615
public.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY5T-GKXH]; Scott D. O’Malia, Commissioner, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n, Opening Statement at the 12th Meeting of the Technology Advisory Committee
(June 3, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatement060314 [https://
perma.cc/RK4T-UK84].
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that suggest that the analytical infrastructure needed to use machine learning
more extensively may soon be realized. Officials at the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), for example, have recognized that in the service of
aviation safety “there is significantly more potential” for the use of big data.81
The U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has included as a
component of a recent Business Technology Strategic Plan the maturation of
“the back-end disciplines of in-memory analytics, big data, and data quality.”82
Similarly, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has developed
a Data Innovation Initiative to support the goal of improving its data analytic
capacity.83 Throughout the Obama Administration, the White House prioritized
big data use across the executive branch through a Big Data Research and
Development Initiative,84 with President Obama’s 2016 budget calling for a $1
billion increase in funding for statistical programs.85
Efforts remain underway not only to create large data sets to support agency
functions but also to make big data more readily analyzable. One example can
be found in the creation of the global Legal Entity Identifier (LEI), a universal
reference code for each entity active in financial markets.86 Treasury’s OFR
launched an effort to establish LEI in 2010,87 and by 2014 the LEI Regulatory
Oversight Committee had assumed operational responsibility for its development.88 Having such a unique identifier will enhance regulators’ ability “to
identify parties to financial transactions instantly and precisely,” allowing the
81. Letter from R. John Hansman, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Aviation Admin. Res., Eng’g & Dev.
Advisory Comm., to Michael P. Huerta, Administrator, U.S. Fed. Aviation Admin. (Oct. 2, 2013),
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ang/offices/tc/about/campus/faa_host/rdm/
media/pdf/Guidance-FY2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VDQ-SVZ3]; see also U.S. FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
MEETING MINUTES OF THE RESEARCH, ENGINEERING, AND DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 7 (2012),
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ang/offices/tc/about/campus/faa_host/rdm/
media/pdf/minutes-FullComm_09262012.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNG9-GET4] (noting that the agency
is “taking a look at overarching data management”).
82. U.S. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIC PLAN 2013–2017, at 8 (2013),
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/it_plan/BusinessTechnologyStrategicPlan2013-2017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L7KE-KPT4].
83. Michael Byrne, Big Data, FCC BLOG (Oct. 28, 2010, 1:06 PM), https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/
blog/2010/10/28/big-data [https://perma.cc/AU7Q-J6XA].
84. See Press Release, Office of Sci. and Tech. Policy, Obama Administration Unveils “Big Data”
Initiative: Announces $200 Million in New R&D Investments (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/big_data_press_release_final_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GX57AB83].
85. Aaron Boyd, Obama Budget Pushes Better Decisions Using Open Data, FED. TIMES (Feb. 3,
2015), http://www.federaltimes.com/story/government/management/budget/2015/02/03/open-dataevidence-based-decisions-funded-2016-budget/22802323 [https://perma.cc/63U6-CQUG].
86. See generally Legal Entity Identifier–Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. OFF. OF FIN. RES.,
http://financialresearch.gov/data/legal-entity-identifier-faqs [https://perma.cc/LH9B-YUG9] (answering
frequently asked questions about the legal entity identifier).
87. See Statement on Legal Entity Identification for Financial Contracts, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,146 (Nov.
30, 2010).
88. Matthew Reed, Legal Entity Identifier System Turns a Corner, U.S. OFF. OF FIN. RES. (July 3,
2014), https://financialresearch.gov/from-the-management-team/2014/07/03/legal-entity-identifier-systemturns-a-corner/ [https://perma.cc/6H64-VFFL].
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authorities to apply machine learning to larger data sets.89
Agencies are also actively working toward development of the cloud storage
systems necessary to exploit the power of machine learning.90 Such storage that
takes place via distributed networks of computers proves to be better suited to
running computationally intensive algorithms, and its availability better facilitates interagency sharing of big data. The FDA, for example, has leveraged
cloud computing to store information on foodborne pathogens, giving the
agency “the ongoing, simultaneous capacity to collect, control and analyze
enormous data sets.”91 Similarly, the EPA created a Cross-Agency Data Analytics and Visualization Program intended to foster the creation of databases that
will permit the analysis of data from many different agencies and organizations.92 The SEC is implementing cloud computing to store and process its one
billion daily records of financial market activities, often time-stamped to the
microsecond, allowing the SEC to “perform analyses of thousands of
stocks . . . involving 100 billion records at a time.”93 The proliferation of such
efforts to capture, share, and analyze vast quantities of data makes it easy to
envision, for example, an extension of the SEC’s cloud computing program that
would eventually allow agency computers to monitor trading activities in real
time, predicting in milliseconds whether a financial transaction is the result of
insider trading and then automatically stopping or reversing trades based on
those predictions.94

89. U.S. OFF. OF FIN. RES., supra note 86.
90. See Response to–Request for Information: Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence,
IBM http://research.ibm.com/cognitive-computing/ostp/rfi-response.shtml [https://perma.cc/5PGSJ24T] (describing how AI systems deployed at scale will require “high-performance distributed cloud
systems, new computing architectures such as neuromorphic and approximate computing, and new
devices such as quantum and new types of memory devices”).
91. Taha A. Kass-Hout, FDA Leverages Big Data Via Cloud Computing, FDA VOICE (June 19,
2014), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2014/06/fda-leverages-big-data-via-cloud-computing
[https://perma.cc/DT6V-N5JK].
92. See EPA’s Cross-Agency Data Analytics and Visualization Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://web.archive.org/web/20160414154548/ https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/
epas-cross-agency-data-analytics-and-visualization-program [https://perma.cc/P769-LGB6].
93. Market Information Data Analytics System, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/
marketstructure/midas.html [https://perma.cc/2YYE-3LKN].
94. Some academic research has already been conducted both to use machine-learning algorithms to
predict such trading violations and to call for their use to make such predictions. See, e.g., Steve
Donoho, Early Detection of Insider Trading in Option Markets, Presented at the Proceedings of the
Tenth ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (2004);
Andrei A. Kirilenko & Andrew W. Lo, Moore’s Law versus Murphy’s Law: Algorithmic Trading and Its
Discontents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 51 (2013); Shawn Mankad et al., Discovering the Ecosystem of an
Electronic Financial Market with a Dynamic Machine-Learning Method, 2 ALGORITHMIC FIN. 151
(2013); Gregory Scopino, Preparing Financial Regulation for the Second Machine Age: The Need for
Oversight of Digital Intermediaries in the Futures Markets, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 439, 443–44
(2015); see also Foresight: The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets, GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI.
42 (2012), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/tacfuturecomputertrading
1012.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW9Z-EXGG].
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With these various efforts underway, the government is well on its way into
the era of machine learning. Before turning to the legal implications of this new
era, we next develop more precisely what machine learning portends for
government agencies and why its use might raise questions under prevailing
administrative law doctrines.
C. ADJUDICATING BY ALGORITHM, RULEMAKING BY ROBOT

What exactly might be problematic about an era in which government
embraces machine learning? Up to this point in our discussion, perhaps the
answer will not be obvious. Were it not for dire warnings in the popular press of
impending artificially intelligent oppression, it might seem that machine learning simply represents a more sophisticated, data-rich, and predictively useful
version of the kind of analytic methods that government agencies have long
used. If that is what machine learning is, and if government can use new
statistical techniques to improve its performance of various functions from
weather forecasting to identifying potentially hazardous chemicals, then presumably a machine-learning era in government should not only be completely
unproblematic but also positively encouraged.
Three principal properties of machine learning combine, however, to distinguish it from other analytical techniques and give rise to potential concerns
about the greater reliance on machine learning by governmental authorities. The
first is machine learning’s self-learning property. The results of algorithms do
not depend on humans specifying in advance how each variable is to be factored
into the predictions; indeed, as long as learning algorithms are running, humans
are not really controlling how they are combining and comparing data. These
algorithms effectively look for patterns on their own. The second key property
is machine learning’s “black box” nature. The results of machine learning
analysis are not intuitively explainable and cannot support causal explanations
of the kind that underlie the reasons traditionally offered to justify governmental
action. Finally, machine learning, as with other computational strategies in
today’s digital era, can be fast and automatic, supporting uses in which the
algorithm produces results that can shorten or potentially bypass human deliberation and decision making. All three of these factors combine to make machinelearning techniques appear qualitatively more independent from humans when
compared to other statistical techniques.
To illustrate these features of machine learning and what they portend
for government, consider the challenges the U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) faces in deciding how to allocate
limited inspection resources to oversee the many thousands of miles of
gas, oil, and chemical pipelines throughout the United States. Major leaks
as well as explosions from leaky pipelines in recent years have made
palpable the significance of effective governmental oversight of pipeline
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safety.95 In recent years, PHMSA has explored using a traditional regression
approach to predict risks of pipeline accidents and decide how to target the
agency’s inspections.96 Although such an attempt to engage in quantitative
decision making is certainly laudable, much more efficient inspection targeting
could result if PHMSA generated its risk predictions using machine learning.
This could be possible in the near future once big data sets are shared in real
time between different agencies and information streams could be provided by
remote-sensing technologies. Instead of being limited to analyzing a dozen or so
variables that PHMSA’s analysts have predetermined should be included in their
regression analysis, machine-learning algorithms could work their way through
massive amounts of data containing hundreds of potentially predictively useful
variables, ranging from pipeline operators’ tax returns to their firms’ workforce
diversity. The resulting predictions of pipeline accident risk could be used not
only to target inspections but also potentially, if such an algorithm could be
supplied with real-time data from remote sensors, to order preemptive shutdowns of pipeline segments that the algorithm predicts are at risk of imminent
failure. To the extent that modern pipeline systems are equipped with computerized, remote shut-off capabilities, a machine-learning algorithm could even be
programmed to send an automatic order to pipeline operator’s system calling for
an immediate, automatic shutdown of a section of pipeline based on real-time
forecasts produced by machine learning, all potentially without any human
intervention.
Machine learning is well suited for automating these kinds of decisions,
given its emphasis on accuracy and the government’s overwhelming need to use
its limited resources to prevent dangers from arising. But notice that a shift to a
machine-learning approach in this context could come along with some qualitative loss of human involvement. Under machine learning, PHMSA analysts
would no longer predetermine which variables should be included in the
agency’s risk models; indeed, they would not even create any risk models at all,
in the sense of building equations specifying exactly how various variables
might impact pipeline risk. Machine learning also does not afford a ready means
of explaining why any section of pipeline should be inspected or shut down.
The computerized nature of machine learning also means that it can automate
decisions currently made by humans, such as the dispatching of inspectors or
even the inspections themselves. It is not difficult to imagine a future in which a
95. See, e.g., David R. Baker, L.A. Gas Leak Plugged, but California Pipelines Regularly Leak, S.F.
CHRON. (Feb. 14, 2016), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/L-A-gas-leak-plugged-butCalifornia-pipelines-6830717.php [https://perma.cc/6HQA-X6FU]; Deirdre Fulton, More Than 300 a
Year: New Analysis Shows Devastating Impact of Pipeline Spills, COMMON DREAMS (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://www.commondreams.org/news/2014/11/17/more-300-year-new-analysis-shows-devastating-impactpipeline-spills [https://perma.cc/L7MN-S7UH].
96. RICK KOWALEWSKI & PEG YOUNG, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, SR-010, DATA-DRIVEN RISK
MODELS COULD HELP TARGET PIPELINE SAFETY INSPECTIONS 3–4 (2008), http://www.rita.dot.gov/ bts/sites/
rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/special_reports_and_issue_briefs/special_report/2008_010/pdf/
entire.pdf [https://perma.cc/4825-D39L].
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machine-learning system based in PHMSA’s headquarters in Washington, D.C.
could be used to automatically dispatch agency drones distributed throughout
the country, having them fly over sections of pipeline to take video images or
collect air quality samples, thereby removing altogether the need to send human
inspectors to the scene.
Admittedly, even with this potential future scenario in mind, it still might not
be self-evident why machine learning may be problematic. After all, machines
have long supported governmental functions in the administrative state. Although not flown by drones, machines currently collect air quality samples in a
network of fixed sites around the country, informing state and federal environmental regulatory decision making.97 Moreover, when it comes to inspecting potentially hazardous sites, eliminating the need for humans to enter high-risk areas
should surely be a positive advance, not a reason for alarm.98 Furthermore,
decisions about the allocation of inspection resources have long been treated—as
a matter of well-accepted law—as falling entirely within an agency’s discretion.99 If agencies can legally allocate inspection resources by the flip of a
coin—that is, sending inspectors to sites at random, as some agencies do—then
they should be able legally to rely on more sophisticated algorithms that deploy
scarce inspection resources automatically but more efficiently.100 For this reason, we foresee comparatively little resistance, as a matter of law, to applications of machine learning that aim to make more efficient use of scarce
inspection resources.
Many uses of machine learning by administrative agencies will be like the
use of machine learning to decide where to send inspectors in that they will
inform actions committed to agency discretion. Most of these uses will be
unproblematic from the standpoint of administrative law.101 Surely the U.S.
Postal Service’s reliance on machine-learning algorithms to sort mail hardly
constitutes any grave threat to society, either existential or constitutional. In
97. See, e.g., Ambient Air Monitoring, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/air-qualitymanagement-process/ambient-air-monitoring [https://perma.cc/GQ2N-SYJE].
98. Cf. Suzanne Goldenberg, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Underwater Robots Trying to Seal Well,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2010, 2:31 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/apr/26/deepwaterhorizon-spill-underwater-robots [https://perma.cc/NAC5-RGKX].
99. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized that
“an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a
decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion”).
100. In addition to New York City’s use of machine learning to determine where to send its building
inspectors, the City of Chicago is using algorithms to allocate food safety inspectors, Mohana
Ravindranath, In Chicago, Food Inspectors Are Guided by Big Data, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-it/in-chicago-food-inspectors-are-guided-by-big-data/2014/
09/27/96be8c68-44e0-11e4-b47c-f5889e061e5f_story.html [https://perma.cc/V25Y-53CG].
101. We recognize, of course, that it might be possible for agencies to abuse their discretion, which
is why we characterize uses of machine learning for discretionary purposes to be virtually unproblematic. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). One way that such discretion could possibly be abused
would be if it were to be deployed in an unlawfully discriminatory fashion. In Section II.C, we consider
whether the use of machine learning even in discretionary enforcement allocation decisions might
offend equal protection.
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addition, even when agency officials use learning algorithms to support actions
that are not committed to agency discretion, if they use them simply to inform
their own independent judgments, this too should be unremarkable. Such use
would be indistinguishable from any other research support or informational
input into agency decision making. The non-shaded parts of Table 1 highlight
several general types of agency uses of machine learning that should easily be
viewed as beyond reproach, at least from the standpoint of existing general
principles of structural law governing the administrative state.
The domains in which machine learning might be of concern, at least as a
prima facie matter, will be those in which artificial intelligence is used more for
determining, rather than just supporting, decisions that are not otherwise committed to agency discretion by law. As shown in the shaded portions of Table 1, that
leaves two important realms in which machine learning could be incorporated
into the administrative state: adjudicating by algorithm and rulemaking by
robot.102
One example of adjudicating by algorithm would be our posited PHMSA
pipeline safety machine-learning system that automatically issues shut-off orders when the system forecasts a heightened risk. It is not difficult to imagine
Table 1. Applications of Machine Learning in the Administrative State

102. Adjudication and rulemaking, of course, are the two canonical types of actions that agencies
may take under the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5), (7) (2012). We have labeled these
two types of administrative action as “non-discretionary” not because agencies are mandated to take
these actions (although sometimes they can be). Rather, we have labeled them this way because these
actions will be surrounded by “law to apply” that will subject these actions to judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). By
“discretionary” in Table 1, we mean simply that an action is “committed to agency discretion” and thus
not subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). We do recognize, of course, that on occasion there
may be law to apply even to supportive uses of analytic techniques or to the use of other factors that
support decisions, such as would be the case if a statute were to prohibit an agency from using machine
learning in even a non-determinative role. Cf. Whitman v. American Trucking Assocs., Inc., 531 U.S.
457 (2001) (holding that the Clean Air Act prohibits the EPA Administrator from considering costs
when setting air quality standards). For these reasons, Table 1 should be viewed simply as a heuristic
intended to illustrate some generalizations about the administrative state.
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other examples of adjudicatory decisions that could be automated by algorithms,103 especially when the relevant criteria for an adjudicatory action are
forward-looking and thus dependent on accurate predictions. At some point, for
example, the FAA might be able to license pilots through an entirely automated
process relying on risk-based machine learning forecasts of individual applicants’ overall level of safety.104 The Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division might conceivably come to rely on machine
learning to predict what effects a proposed merger would have on future
competition and market pricing, perhaps entirely automating the antitrust review process.
When it comes to rulemaking by robot, we need not rely entirely on the
imagination. The City of Los Angeles’ current traffic signaling system illustrates
a very simple but still real-world application of rulemaking by robot. Although
deciding the color of traffic lights may seem like a trivial example, a traffic
signal does determine what rule applies to anyone who wants to drive along a
city street at a given period of time. Yet with the system in place in Los Angeles,
just as no human determines when a traffic light should be red or green, no
government official can really explain why the city’s machine-learning system
sets any given traffic light (that is, rule) when it does. We can expect it will not
be long before more government authorities, at the local and federal levels, will
be able to develop similar systems in their own domains that are conceptually
equivalent to Los Angeles’ traffic control system.
It is not difficult to imagine more complex and consequential examples of
regulating by robot. Consider the possibility that the SEC might find it beneficial, even necessary, to govern the world of high-speed electronic trading by
making nimble and equally high-speed adjustments to the rules of market
transactions, perhaps modifying stock exchanges’ current, rigid trading circuit
breakers with ones that adjust in real time.105 The U.S. Department of the
Treasury, for similar reasons, might plausibly seek to establish a dynamic,
automated process according to which certain macro-prudential rules governing
financial institutions respond to real-time market changes indicative of systemic
103. Imagination may not be required for much longer. IBM is currently developing machinelearning algorithms to predict smog levels in China, predictions that may soon be used to determine
governmental shutdowns of factories or limits on traffic volumes. Will Knight, Can Machine Learning
Help Lift China’s Smog?, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/600993/
can-machine-learning-help-lift-chinas-smog/ [https://perma.cc/SL77-VJVK].
104. Currently, such forward-looking adjudicatory decisions like licensing are based on rules,
making the issue one of whether applicants comply with the applicable rule, or the criteria contained in
a rule, and thus qualify to receive a license. Machine learning makes an alternative adjudicatory
framework possible, one that considers forecasted risk based on an algorithmic analysis of potentially
hundreds of variables. Machine learning has been shown to be an effective tool in making certain
forward-looking adjudicatory decisions in the criminal law system. Richard A. Berk et al., Forecasting
Domestic Violence: A Machine Learning Approach to Help Inform Arraignment Decisions, 13 J.
EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 94, 110 (2016) [hereinafter Berk, Forecasting Domestic Violence]; Berk et al., supra
note 50, at 208.
105. See supra note 94.
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risk.106 Even when time is not so critical and the “good cause” exemption to the
standard rulemaking process might not apply, it is hardly unimaginable today
that agencies could automate entirely the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, especially for the kinds of routine rules that make up the bulk of government rules.107 Natural language processing programs could even conceivably
read and summarize any public comments submitted on proposed rules and
potentially even craft some of the regulatory language.108
For anything but perhaps the simplest rules, like traffic signals, rulemaking
by robot will require that machine learning be combined with other analytic
techniques. Rules are forward-looking, but they also involve complex normative
judgments, not merely predictive ones. Determining the content of rules often
106. For a discussion of how predictions of systemic risk can affect rulemaking by regulatory
agencies, see Dimitrios Bisias et al., A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics 2, 10–11 (U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury Office of Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 0001, 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
wsr/ofr/Documents/OFRwp0001_BisiasFloodLoValavanis_ASurveyOfSystemicRiskAnalytics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8LJ-8EYJ].
107. The notice-and-comment process, and the good cause exception to it, is provided at 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (2012). It is important to recognize that we have adopted a formulation of algorithm-created rules
resembling that of rules as they exist today; an algorithm would promulgate rules specifying a
particular course of action, a particular safety standard, a particular acceptable emissions level, or so
forth. Under this formulation, any changes to an algorithm that result in a different prescription,
including merely re-running the algorithm as specified on new data, would necessitate a new rulemaking process, absent a good cause exemption. But, because machine learning is likely to be of most
utility when engaged to regulate dynamic, time-sensitive environments, it is probable that such an
exemption could often or even categorically be claimed. An alternative formulation might be one in
which rules state merely that an algorithm will be used to promulgate prescriptions continuously;
instead of a rule reciting a particular course of action or safety standard on the basis of algorithmic
output, the rule would say that a future algorithm will run continuously and be updated dynamically to
decide the appropriate course of action or safety standard in the future. Cf. Coglianese, supra note 25, at
370–71 (noting the possibility of “a reconceptualization of the form in which rules are promulgated”).
Such a formulation probably would not necessitate that a new rulemaking be commenced whenever the
algorithm is updated, but it might be legally problematic given the need for reason-giving and
transparency. See infra Section II.D.
108. Already agencies use digital tools to sort and identify duplicates in comments submitted in
rulemaking proceedings that have generated large volumes of public submissions. See, e.g., Jane E.
Fountain, Prospects for Improving the Regulatory Process Using E-Rulemaking, 46 COMMC’NS ACM
63, 63–64 (2003) (discussing federal agency use of automated tools to sort comments beginning as
early as 1997). Similar programs are now capable of processing data and automatically writing prose, at
least for now in the context of sports reports and fiction. See Ian Crouch, The Sportswriting Machine,
NEW YORKER (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/sporting-scene/the-sportswritingmachine [https://perma.cc/25FB-UBFS]; Matt McFarland, A Computer Program Is Writing New ‘Friends’
Episodes. Are They Any Good?, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
innovations/wp/2016/01/21/a-computer-program-is-writing-new-friends-episodes-are-they-any-good/
[https://perma.cc/57FC-UY86]. By itself, an algorithm might not be capable of writing the entire
content of a final rule document, as sections such as the summary would presumably require a nuanced
explanation of the background of a rule and its purposes, and natural language processing cannot
generate such complete thoughts de novo. Natural language processing could, however, probably write
sections of a rule document that require statements of facts. Such algorithms can rely on previous
examples of how factual statements are worded to create sentences that describe new facts in a
fill-in-the-blank manner. Other sections of rule documents require human input related to the goal of a
potential rule, but such sections could plausibly be written in advance by humans and then the rest
could be filled in with algorithm-written content.
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requires making difficult choices about the entities to be regulated, the conduct
or outcome that the rule tells these entities to achieve or avoid, and the nature
and degree of the consequences that follow from adhering or not adhering to
the rule’s commands.109 Machine-learning algorithms cannot directly make the
choices about these different aspects of a rule’s content not only because some
of these choices are normative ones, but also because learning algorithms
are merely predictive and thus unable to overlay causal interpretations on the
relationship between possible regulations and estimated effects.110 The justification for new rules depends, after all, on the effects that their adoption and
implementation are likely to cause.111
Nevertheless, it may be possible for machine learning to make rules in this
fashion when used in conjunction with procedures known as agent-based models (ABM) or multi-agent systems (MAS).112 Agent-based modeling refers to
the use of an algorithm consisting of a mathematically-defined environment that
includes agents that observe the overall environment and take actions designed
to reach a specified goal.113 Multi-agent systems are similar to agent-based
models but with multiple autonomous agents interacting with each other.114
With either of these agent-based techniques, the agents—which, in the rulemaking context, would include the regulator and the regulated entities—must have
some defined decision-making processes that allow them to translate observations of the environment into actions. These decision-making processes can be
specified a priori by the researcher or regulatory official, but such a priori
knowledge often does not exist or is not sophisticated enough to mimic how
real-world agents make their decisions. Therefore, machine learning—often
called reinforcement learning in these applications (or what we will, for ease of
reference, call “embedded machine learning”)—is incorporated into agentbased models’ decision-making processes of individual agents. The mathematical agents within these systems, in other words, learn how to make decisions.
109. See Cary Coglianese, Engaging Business in the Regulation of Nanotechnology, in GOVERNING
UNCERTAINTY: ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE AGE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 46, 50–51 (Christopher J.
Bosso ed., 2010).
110. See BERK, supra note 33, at 9–17. This difficulty also often faces even conventional techniques
in attempting to claim causal inference. See Richard A. Berk et al., What You Can Learn from Wrong
Causal Models, in HANDBOOK OF CAUSAL ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 403, 422–23 (Stephen L.
Morgan ed., 2013).
111. CARY COGLIANESE, MEASURING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF REGULATION
AND REGULATORY POLICY, OECD Expert Paper No. 1 (Aug. 2012), http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatorypolicy/1_coglianese%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZZZ-NERP].
112. For incorporation of machine learning into ABM, see, for example, W. Rand, Machine
Learning Meets Agent-Based Modeling: When Not to Go to a Bar 2 (Northwestern Univ. Working
Paper, 2006), https://ccl.northwestern.edu/papers/agent2006rand.pdf [https://perma.cc/SU6T-AB9V]. For
use of machine learning in MAS, see Lucian Buşoniu et al., A Comprehensive Survey of Multiagent
Reinforcement Learning, 38 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS, PART C: APPLICATIONS AND REVIEWS 156, 156 (2008).
113. For a more formal definition of ABM, see Nigel Gilbert, Agent-Based Models, in 153 QUANTITATIVE APPLICATIONS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (John Fox ed., 2008).
114. For a more formal definition of MAS, see Buşoniu et al., supra note 112, at 156.
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To translate these embedded machine-learning techniques to possible rulemaking applications, consider how the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) might proceed if it were to create an automated process for
determining whether to implement a new workplace safety regulation. OSHA
could implement an algorithm in which the modeled agents are the employers
being regulated. The environment in which these agents operate would include
mathematically-specified factors capable of influencing agent behavior, including a possible regulation. The employer-agents in the model would “observe”
the environment, which would include different regulatory alternatives (including an environment with no regulation), and then “take” actions, such as
complying with the regulation, to reach their own goals, perhaps defined as
profit maximization. Now, although OSHA would like to use this agent-based
model to see how employers respond to the potential new regulation and,
consequently, what effects the regulation may have, OSHA does not know a
priori how employers will decide how to respond to any regulation. The
agent-based model would therefore use a machine-learning technique to select
employers’ optimal responses to the regulation given their profit maximization
goal.
This example suggests how OSHA might use machine learning embedded
within an agent-based model of the effects of a proposed regulation. But the
techniques’ real potential to inform the content of regulations comes from the
ability of OSHA to include an agent representing itself in the ABM. This
mathematically-represented agent would “issue” multiple different possible
regulations—formulated in advance by human programmers—and then “select”
the regulatory alternative that yields those effects, as defined in relation to
observable components of the environment, that maximize an objective function
(or goal) established by the real-world OSHA. The possible regulations analyzed in this fashion could assume any number of different combinations of
regulatory targets, commands, and consequences, with the forecasted effect of
these regulations on the actions of regulated entities being observed through the
modeling exercise. Unlike in the adjudicatory context, where machine learning
directly makes individualized forecasts and where an adjudication can be
“determined” simply by whether an algorithm forecasts risks or other outcomes
above a threshold level, in the rulemaking context machine learning would need
to be nested within a larger decision-making model to support automated
regulatory decisions. Machine learning predictions would, within an agentbased simulation, inform agents’ actions, which in turn would generate predicted outcomes from different regulatory permutations.
This fusion of agent-based or multi-agent models with machine learning may
hold great potential for assisting in certain kinds of rulemaking, but, even with
this fusion, governmental reliance on algorithms would still not cede entirely
the involvement of humans. As already indicated, at a foundational level,
humans will still need to choose and then input into embedded machinelearning systems the data, as well as overarching goals to be maximized and
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constraints to be minimized. Moreover, due to data limitations as well as core
uncertainties, many rulemaking decisions will still by necessity call for human
judgment and thus be incapable of automation.
As with any statistical technique, the algorithms that could be embedded in
automated rulemaking models will require data. Because all historical data arise
within a world with a different rule than the one proposed (even if that is no rule
at all), regulators will seldom (if ever) find enough data to correspond to all
possible forms a future regulation and resulting environmental state might take.
This is often a challenge in applications of agent-based models in other contexts, such as healthcare provision. In those other contexts, the lack of data is
often addressed through the creation of simulated environmental data.115 Generation of simulated data, however, requires that the architecture of the environment being modeled, and the relationships between components of that
environment, be sufficiently well known a priori as to be specifiable. Embedded
machine-learning techniques have been successfully developed for applications
like modeling how infectious patients should be moved around a hospital.116 In
that context, the environment of interest can be reasonably well specified. The
actors and parameters are limited—for example, healthcare professionals, infected patients, uninfected patients, and rooms—and the analyst knows a priori
enough about how diseases are transmitted to generate simulated data using
probabilities of infection based on proximity and time spent near infected
patients. This kind of a priori knowledge would seem to be less likely to exist in
the more complex or uncertain situations that many regulators address, where
the relevant causal relationships do not stem from processes as law-like as
biological disease transmission. If the system being modeled is extremely
complex—as with many forms of regulation, whether of complex financial
instruments or advanced industrial operations117—the regulator may not know
enough about the underlying causal architecture to generate simulated environmental data bearing any resemblance to real-world data.
Of course, despite these difficulties, the conditions for using embedded
machine learning for rulemaking may still sometimes exist. In a comment letter
to the SEC, for example, academic and business experts in agent-based modeling and financial markets have advocated the use of such models in regulating
equity markets, arguing that algorithms in this context would be sufficiently
specifiable.118 Although we take no position on these specific claims, we raise

115. See, e.g., Marek Laskowski, A Prototype Agent Based Model and Machine Learning Hybrid
System for Healthcare Decision Support, in DIGITAL ADVANCES IN MEDICINE, E-HEALTH, AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 230, 231 (2013).
116. Id. at 235–36.
117. See generally CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES (2d
ed. 1999).
118. W. Brian Arthur et al., Comment Letter to Elizabeth M. Murphy on File Number S7-02010
“Concept Release on Equity Market Structure” (Apr. 16, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0210/s70210-109.pdf [https://perma.cc/GTE3-W2M8].
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them to suggest the plausibility of using embedded machine learning to automate the process of selecting and designing regulations in some settings.
Agency officials will need to determine the applicability of any embedded
machine-learning rulemaking tool on a case-by-case basis.
Our point is to show that, even if many applications of machine learning will
be completely benign as a matter of administrative law, agencies may soon be
able, for the first time, to set the content of certain types of rules by automated
artificial intelligence techniques. Whether in making individualized forecasts or
in feeding into more generalized modeling results, machine-learning algorithms
have the potential to transform key governmental functions in ways that not
only augment human judgment but replace it with automated, algorithmic
analysis. For some observers, this prospect will trigger loud alarm bells of the
kind set off by the use of artificial intelligence more generally. At a minimum,
the prospect of either robotic rulemaking or algorithmic adjudication raises
important questions about whether such automated techniques can be squared
with core principles of constitutional and administrative law.
II. THE LEGALITY OF MACHINE LEARNING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
As government agencies continue on the path toward increased reliance on
machine learning in administrative decision making, public officials, lawyers,
and scholars will confront choices about whether to encourage or constrain this
technology. Making these choices will depend, at least in the first instance, on
assessing how agency use of machine learning would conform to the cornerstones of constitutional and administrative law: principles of nondelegation, due
process, antidiscrimination, and transparency.119 These core legal principles,
against which we assess machine learning in this Part, present issues that arise
from the mathematical distinctiveness of machine learning, in particular its
self-learning, black-box, and automated properties. Especially when machine
learning is used to determine outcomes that are judicially reviewable, its

119. A further concern widely aired in discussions of big data and machine learning centers on
privacy. Privacy concerns are not trivial, but we do not take them up in detail here in part because they
have been widely considered elsewhere. See, e.g., Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due
Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014);
Roger Allan Ford & W. Nicholson Price II, Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box Medicine, 23
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2016); Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV.
1125, 1170–71 (2015); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
393, 395–97 (2014); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 41, 42–43 (2013); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time
for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 65 (2012). We also do not focus on privacy concerns
because they are not unique to administrative agencies’ use of machine learning. Our principal concern
here is with issues that are distinctively applicable to the use of machine learning in the administrative
state. Furthermore, many of machine learning’s privacy implications could be more accurately characterized as implications of the use of big data; although algorithms themselves may make possible new
kinds of inferences, this ability is manifested only in large data sets, so the underlying privacy problems
that others have flagged appear to have been raised more by the collection of big data than by the use of
machine-learning algorithms per se.
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properties combine to surface some first-order questions stemming from a legal
system that has been historically premised on the existence of governmental
decision makers who are human beings.
Our answers to the legal questions presented in this Part must, by necessity,
assume a degree of generality. Machine learning is not a singular entity with
one prescribed method of implementation, so we cannot pretend to offer a
definitive legal analysis of all possible applications of artificial intelligence in
the administrative process. How machine learning will come to be used in
particular contexts, by particular agencies, will no doubt prove pivotal to
determining its legality under certain doctrines. Neither the technique of machine learning nor its uses are completely uniform—even while sharing general
properties—and even some of those general properties are far from absolute.
Still, learning algorithms do exhibit to a sufficient degree some core features
that make it possible to offer some overarching conclusions. For example, even
though algorithms can learn on their own and support automated decisions,
humans still must decide how algorithms are specified, deployed, and integrated
into broader administrative processes. Machine-learning algorithms are thus
“autonomous” only in the sense that they can run continuously and have the
potential to translate their outputs automatically into regulatory actions.120 They
do not set their own objective functions nor are they completely outside human
control. An algorithm, by its very definition, must have its parameters and uses
specified by humans, and this property will likely prove pivotal in the legal
assessment of specific applications of artificial intelligence by federal administrative agencies.
A. NONDELEGATION

Military weapons systems driven by algorithms raise serious concerns because, with these systems, decisions possessing life-and-death consequences
may no longer be made directly by humans.121 For similar reasons, concerns
could be raised about administrative agencies’ use of artificial intelligence.
Although officials at administrative agencies do not fire missiles, they are
responsible for choices that can carry equally important consequences, such as
determining the safety of food, water, and drugs. If concerns exist over delegating too much control to non-humans in the military context, then perhaps at
least a prima facie case exists against the use of algorithms to make administrative and regulatory decisions.

120. Note that this limited “autonomy” also implies, given our description of how machine learning
operates, the potential for algorithms to yield unexpected, seemingly original outcomes. Also, although
we have chosen to use and qualify the term “autonomy,” other legal literature on robotics refers, with
good reason, to similarly limited independence as “emergence.” See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Robotics and the
Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CAL. L. REV. 513, 539–40 (2015).
121. See Markoff, supra note 14.
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The U.S. Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative powers” of the federal
government “shall be vested” in Congress.122 Courts have long accepted that
Congress can, within limits, delegate authority to administrative agencies headed
by appointed officers who, although unelected, are overseen in various ways by
members of Congress and the President.123 Yet the nondelegation doctrine, still
a fixture in American constitutional and administrative law, places some theoretical limits on those delegations, which must, for example, be accompanied by an
intelligible principle. Although this doctrine has long accepted even broad
delegations of authority to administrative agencies, the law has always assumed
that the recipient of that authority would be a human being, such as an officer of
the United States or, on occasion, a private individual or group of individuals.
As machine learning becomes more advanced and government agencies use it
more extensively, decision-making authority could effectively become delegated still further—to computerized algorithms. Yet if government actions
should be undertaken by humans, then delegation to autonomously learning
machines could potentially transfer governmental power outside the bounds that
the Constitution permits. Such an objection under the nondelegation doctrine
has never been squarely contemplated under previous judicial rulings, but it
bears clear conceptual affinity with the spirit and tradition of the nondelegation
doctrine. The underlying concern is the same: the improper transfer of legislative authority.
Given that the nondelegation doctrine has traditionally governed the granting
of authority by Congress to agencies, we confront two possible scenarios. The
first assumes that Congress has granted authority to an agency to deploy
machine-learning algorithms to make administrative decisions. The second is a
scenario in which Congress has delegated some kind of administrative authority
to the head of an agency in a conventional manner, but the relevant agency
official then seeks out and relies upon a machine-learning system to exercise
that authority. We will address both of these possible situations in turn, even
though the second scenario might be the one that is more likely to arise in
practice, given that statutes have not been drafted with algorithmic administration in mind. However, the second scenario raises different, even if related,
questions of statutory interpretation—namely, whether a statute granting an
agency certain governmental authority precludes the agency from subdelegating
its decision making to machine-learning algorithms.124 We will put such a
statutory question to the side initially, focusing on the first scenario, in which
Congress delegates authority to agencies to regulate by robot. This scenario
allows us to focus directly on the constitutional question raised by what Justice

122. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
123. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 505 (1935).
124. Executive exercise of legislative authority by administrative agencies must conform to statutory
provisions. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (“The President’s
power, if any, to issue the order must stem from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”).
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Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar has dubbed the problem of “cyberdelegation.”125
1. Cyberdelegation
The answer to the constitutional question of cyberdelegation should not be
difficult—and not merely because the nondelegation doctrine has been widely
recognized to have had only “one good year.”126 A congressional authorization
of rulemaking by robot should not offend the nondelegation doctrine because
presumably such an authorization would be made with the understanding that
algorithmic policy determinations depend inherently on well-specified objective
functions. It seems unlikely that any Congress that would expressly contemplate
the use of artificial intelligence by agencies would not also include in legislation
authorizing such use a sufficiently intelligible principle that would satisfy the
demands of the nondelegation doctrine. Under this doctrine, rulemaking authority can be delegated to agencies only if Congress provides in its authorizing
legislation “an intelligible principle” channeling and constraining the exercise
of that delegated authority.127 As every lawyer today knows, the level of
intelligibility demanded by the courts has hardly been substantial. The courts
have recognized that agencies can be delegated power “under broad general
directives”128 that facilitate governmental efficacy “in our increasingly complex
society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems.”129 As a
result, Congress must delegate in ways “delineat[ing] the general policy, the
public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated
authority.”130 Courts have even upheld delegations of authority directing, explicitly, only that agencies must act in the “public interest.”131
To say that an intelligible principle must guide agency actions is to say that
those actions must be aligned with a goal or, in mathematical terms, a type of
objective function. An objective function is an essential prerequisite for the use
of machine learning, and it will by necessity provide sufficient intelligibility to
withstand the test embedded in the nondelegation doctrine. If a goal as broad
and qualitative as “acting in the public interest” is legally sufficient, then goals
defined in precise, quantifiable, and measurable ways must be so as well. A
125. Cuéllar, supra note 25. This first scenario is important to focus on also because it turns out
ultimately to be where the statutory interpretation question raised by the second scenario leads. If a
court were to conclude that a statute either authorized, or at least did not preclude, agencies to
subdelegate to machines, the question then would still arise whether the Constitution permits Congress
to delegate authority in such a way that allows agencies to delegate further to machine-learning
algorithms.
126. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000). The Supreme
Court has struck down legislation under the nondelegation doctrine on only a couple of occasions—and
only during the New Deal. Id.
127. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
128. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
129. Id. See also Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r, 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941).
130. Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946); see also Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 424–25 (1944).
131. See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943).
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Congress that deliberately contemplated and authorized an agency to use machine learning would presumably also understand the need to provide guidance
about the necessary objective function for algorithms to optimize, and it would
be more likely than usual to articulate a sufficiently clear set of goals that would
pass the intelligibility muster.
What about the recipients of the authority to whom Congress delegates?
Typically, these recipients have been agency officials, but on occasion Congress
has tried to delegate certain kinds of authority to private actors. When Congress
has delegated lawmaking power to private entities, the Supreme Court has declared such arrangements to be “legislative delegation in its most obnoxious
form.”132 The Court’s disapproval of congressional authorization of private
decision making with legal implications raises a key question about the possibility of congressional authorization of algorithmic decision making. If delegating
outside the government to the private sector is so disfavored, then presumably a
delegation of rulemaking authority still further—not even to a human being, but
to a machine—would seem more extreme and objectionable.
We think courts would be unlikely to equate delegation to machines with
delegation to private individuals or entities for three reasons. First, machinelearning algorithms lack the essence of what makes a delegation to private
individuals so obnoxious—the self-interest of those private parties. Private
parties have their own biases and interests that lead them to make privately
optimal decisions that may not be socially optimal.133 By contrast, what machinelearning algorithms will optimize are the objectives that those deploying them
specify should be optimized. As long as this specification is done by authorized
government officials, the concerns about bias or self-interest that animate the
constitutional prohibition on delegations to the private sector should not exist.
Second, even when they rely on machine learning, human governmental
officials will retain ultimate control over the specification of algorithms and the
translation of their outputs to regulatory actions. That the government maintains
such a level of direction and control has made it sufficient for courts to uphold
delegations to private parties. As long as a private party’s participation in
rulemaking falls short of possessing the ultimate decisional control, courts have
allowed delegations to the private sector. The Supreme Court has deemed
constitutional, for example, legislation providing industry with a role in policymaking by a government commission because private firms only “function[ed]

132. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); see also Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am.
R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231 (2015); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
133. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3, 3–7 (1971). Arguably, the constitutional prohibition on delegation of rulemaking power to private
entities emanates as much from due process considerations as from strictly nondelegation concerns.
See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, The Shadow Debate Over Private Nondelegation in DOT v. Association of
American Railroads, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 359, 393 (2015) (pointing to “the fundamental unfairness
of putting the regulation of an industry in the hands of an entity that has a profit-making interest in the
outcome of the regulation”).
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subordinately to the Commission.”134 More generally, the Court has permitted
delegation to private parties when their actions are limited to advisory decisions
rather than ones that are binding on others.135
The kind of rulemaking by robot that we described in section I.C—and even
just the phrase “rulemaking by robot”—might at first glance suggest a role for
machines that exceeds the limits established for delegations to private entities.
Yet even though machine-learning systems are more autonomous from humans
than are conventional statistical techniques, their autonomy is still far from the
constitutionally impermissible kind. Even if rulemaking were to be fully automated, the underlying algorithms, just to function correctly, must still be so well
specified that important discretion would remain with the human creators and
overseers of the algorithms. As previously discussed, algorithms could not
themselves craft regulatory content de novo; humans must specify the targets,
commands, and consequences of potential rules from which an embedded
machine-learning system might choose the best.136 More importantly, humans
can, at any time, choose to reject a machine-chosen rule, alter an algorithm’s
specifications, or even “pull the plug” on the system entirely. If nothing else, as
long as rules need to be officially signed or approved by a human official, then
humans will retain ultimate control.137
Finally, although algorithms can act faster than humans—which might imply
a lack of control—ultimately algorithms are mere measurement tools, which the
courts widely accept as legally permissible. The objection, of course, would be
that humans cannot, as a practical matter, exercise meaningful control over
automated rulemaking systems in high-speed settings. In these (and perhaps
other) situations, it may simply not be practical for human officials to monitor
algorithms’ output in real time and exercise their abilities to approve or reject
rules or even “pull the plug” on the system. These officials would, of course,
still retain the ability to disable or modify a rulemaking-by-robot system
retroactively. Although it might be reasonable in some circumstances to demand
more than retroactive review, in most instances automated artificial intelligence
systems, once constructed by humans, will typically function as legally permissible measurement tools.
134. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 399 (1940); see also, e.g., Currin v.
Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15 (1939).
135. See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(“Congress may formalize the role of private parties in proposing regulations so long as that role is
merely ‘as an aid’ to a government agency that retains the discretion to ‘approve[], disapprove[], or
modif[y]’ them.” (quoting Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co., 310 U.S. at 388)); Pittston Co. v. United
States, 368 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2004) (“These powers given to the Trustees are of an administrative
or advisory nature, and delegation of them to the Trustees does not, we conclude, violate the
nondelegation doctrine.”); United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1129 (3d Cir. 1989) (“In essence, the
Cattlemen’s Board and the Operating Committee serve an advisory function . . . .”).
136. See supra Section I.B.
137. Cf. Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies: A Debate over Law or
Politics?, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 646 (2010); Cary Coglianese, The Emptiness of Decisional Limits:
Reconceiving Presidential Control of the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 43 (2017).
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In Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, the FCC relied on a private company,
Arbitron, to measure local radio station audiences, and these measurements
provided critical inputs to rules on station ownership that were required to serve
the public interest, in part, by ensuring competition.138 The court ruled that
reliance on Arbitron was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power,
noting: “Arbitron will only provide a mechanism for measuring [market] concentration. Because the Commission remains the sole arbiter of whether a proposed
radio station combination serves the public interest, no improper delegation will
occur.”139 Thus, because the Commission specified the kind of rule—whether
an ownership pattern is legal—and the goal to be served by the rule—a radio
station combination ensuring diversity and competition sufficient to serve the
public interest—private parties were allowed to control the methods used to
measure diversity and competition and provide measurements that were then
translated into rules.
Analogously, if an agency creates an embedded machine-learning system by
supplying the possible rule options and the objective function, the implementation of an algorithm that maximizes that objective function and immediately
promulgates the resulting rule should be sustained against nondelegation objections because it is functionally serving just as a measurement tool. From the
standpoint of the nondelegation doctrine, the use of machine learning is not
conceptually any different than the constitutional use of other machines or
instruments. When FDA officials use measuring devices like thermometers to
determine the optimal temperature at which to store fish, they are no more
delegating impermissibly to those devices than if they were to rely on machinelearning algorithms.
For these reasons, not only would legislation authorizing machine-learning
applications be unlikely to offend the intelligible principle requirement, it also
should not constitute a prohibited delegation of authority to an entity outside of
government. Cyberdelegation might well look somewhat novel, but it is not
unlike government reliance on measurement devices and thus unlikely to exceed constitutional constraints on the delegation of governing authority.
2. Statutory Subdelegation
Having concluded that congressional authorization of rulemaking by robot is
unlikely to offend the nondelegation doctrine, we return to the issue of subdelegation. We noted at the outset of this section that the subdelegation issue involves,
in the first instance, answering a statutory interpretation question. Specifically,
would an agency head’s reliance on machine-learning algorithms exceed authority delegated by Congress via statutory language specifically authorizing “the

138. 373 F.3d 372, 387 (3d Cir. 2004). Specifically, Arbitron’s measurements of radio station
markets informed the legal limit on the number of radio stations within one market that may be owned
by the same entity. See id.
139. Id. at 425.
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Administrator” or “the Secretary” to act? It should be evident that, for reasons
similar to those we have just presented about delegations to private entities,
subdelegations to machines pose no categorical legal concerns. Administrators
do not exceed their statutory authority by relying on thermometers or other
measurement devices. Nor do they transgress their statutory authority by relying
on aides and subordinate officials because ultimate decision-making authority in
such cases is never completely or irrevocably subdelegated, given administrators’ need to endorse, or their ability to override, what their subordinates do.140
The same would be true of reliance on machine-learning algorithms.
Despite demonstrating that regulating by robot is unlikely to violate the
nondelegation doctrine, our analysis should not, of course, be taken to imply
that agency actions will never be struck down on grounds related to delegation.
Delegations, for example, may be constrained by how much judicial deference
courts give to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Admittedly,
Chevron141 deference would appear to be considerable, as courts are generally
instructed to defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes.142 For this reason, we find it difficult to see how an agency’s decision to
use machine learning, even if central to an agency’s statutory construction,
could rise to the level of unreasonableness typically required for courts to reject
agency interpretations. Nonetheless, given that judges have yet to face robotic
rulemaking processes like those we described in section I.C, there remains a
possibility that they may, in certain situations, view administrative algorithms
with a particular aversion. Furthermore, given what seems to be a growing
currency of arguments that courts have been overly or inappropriately deferen-

140. Now-judge David Barron and now-Justice Elena Kagan have argued that the presence of an
intra-agency subdelegation should affect the level of deference given to agency actions. David J. Barron
& Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (2001). Specifically, they
proposed that interpretations authorized by agency leaders who also take responsibility for rules they
personally authorize should be given Chevron deference, whereas interpretations made by lower-level
employees should receive only more limited Skidmore deference. They argued that political accountability and thorough decision making are more likely to arise when high-level, appointed agency members
have a significant hand in the rulemaking process. If courts followed their approach in cases challenging a subdelegation to a machine-learning system, perhaps such a system should receive additional
scrutiny when only low-level agency members specify the objective functions and other normative
choices embedded in the algorithms. Furthermore, although such an approach would calibrate deference based on a hierarchy of the human decision makers specifying the algorithms, an alternative
application of Barron and Kagan’s proposal might not start with the assumption that the decision
makers are indeed humans. Rather, as Associate Justice Cuéllar has written, courts might view the
algorithms themselves as the decision makers and give deference accordingly. See Cuéllar, supra note
25, at 17–19. He also rightfully acknowledges, though, that such “policing the line between automated
decision and decisions support is difficult.” Id. at 18.
141. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
142. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (“When Congress has ‘explicitly
left a gap for an agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation,’ and any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts
unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44) (citations omitted)).
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tial to agencies,143 the possibility of future changes in deference standards
cannot be overlooked. It is also possible, of course, for Congress in the future
simply to prohibit an agency—or perhaps all agencies—from subdelegating to
automated systems based on machine-learning algorithms. Despite these future
possibilities arising on statutory grounds or potential changes to the Chevron
doctrine, when it comes to the core constitutional question, we do not foresee
delegation considerations posing any substantial legal hurdle to regulatory
applications of machine learning.
B. DUE PROCESS

If the prospect of rulemaking by robot might animate concerns about the
nondelegation doctrine, the prospect of adjudicating by algorithm will no doubt
raise due process concerns. Administrative agencies, after all, are expected to
provide adequate procedural due process when taking actions that could deprive
individuals or entities of protected liberty interests or property rights and
entitlements.144 These deprivations can occur whenever agencies exercise their
adjudicatory authority, such as when the EPA orders businesses to engage in the
costly cleanup of hazardous waste for which they are deemed responsible145 or
the Social Security Administration terminates financial payments of governmental benefits to individuals deemed to be no longer eligible.146 In the machinelearning era, would an agency’s reliance on an automated machine-learning
system to make such adjudicatory decisions constitute a violation of an individual’s constitutional right to due process?
As we noted at the outset of this Part, much will turn on how machine
learning is used and how adjudications by algorithm are conducted. Machinelearning systems could be used, as discussed in section I.C, simply to generate
inferences that constitute but one of several inputs into an independent judgment made by human officials. Or they could be used to make automatic
decisions about deprivations of protected rights and interests. This latter approach, involving automated, algorithmic decisions in adjudicatory matters,
would seem the most likely to deny individuals their due process right to a

143. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Vive la Deference?: Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative
and Judicial Discretion, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1294, 1319–26 (2015).
144. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445–46 (1915) (suggesting that
a right to be heard is necessary when a “relatively small number of persons [is] concerned, who [are]
exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds,” but not in instances of adoption of
widely-applicable rules); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (“[S]omething more than [an
opportunity to submit objections in writing], even in proceedings for taxation, is required by due
process of law. . . . [E]ven here a hearing in its very essence demands that he who is entitled to it shall
have the right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however
informal.”). See generally Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV.
1044 (1984).
145. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 21–29 (D.D.C. 2009).
146. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323–25 (1976).
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hearing—one of the canonical tenets of procedural due process.147 Even so, we
will explain why even such machine-learning-based decisions are in no way
uniquely barred from satisfying due process. After reaching this conclusion,
though, we will highlight an area of tension in current case law that may make it
difficult to for agencies to determine when procedural protections are needed in
an age of algorithmic adjudication.
1. Tests for Due Process
The landmark case of Goldberg v. Kelly is usually recognized for establishing
that due process protections extend to recipients of government welfare benefits,
which previously had been considered privileges that did not afford the same
protection as constitutional rights.148 Although Goldberg is often cited for the
Court’s rejection of the right–privilege distinction, just as central to the Court’s
decision was the importance of welfare recipients having the ability to appear in
person before the government official who makes the decision about whether to
terminate individual benefits.149 The Court rejected a process that was based on
written documentation, finding that it was even insufficient for a human caseworker to present the case on behalf of the welfare recipient.150
Six years later, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court held that, in the
context of Social Security disability benefits, the government could structure a
process based solely on paperwork review and without offering the recipients of
disability benefits a pre-termination hearing before an administrative official.151
The Court did not overturn Goldberg, but instead it offered the now-canonical
balancing test involving three factors that must be weighed in determining
whether due process has been satisfied:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.152

147. Although we do not take up the possibility that machine-learning algorithms could actually
“conduct” adjudicatory hearings, we note the remote possibility that advances in artificial intelligence
may one day permit such hearings. Cf. Judith Newman, To Siri, With Love, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/fashion/how-apples-siri-became-one-autistic-boys-bff.html [https://
perma.cc/BF65-BH5G] (describing developmentally beneficial “discussions” between Apple’s digital
assistant Siri and autistic children).
148. 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
149. Id. at 268 (finding unconstitutional procedures that “do not permit recipients to appear
personally with or without counsel before the official who finally determines continued eligibility” and
that do not allow recipients “to present evidence to that official orally, or to confront or cross-examine
adverse witnesses”).
150. Id. at 269.
151. 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976).
152. Id. at 335.
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The Mathews Court explicitly noted that, “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”153
With Mathews balancing now defining procedural due process, we conclude
that algorithmic adjudication would appear to fare suitably well in most instances (even if Goldberg might still preclude reliance on machine learning in
the context of state welfare benefits). Of course, given that the Mathews
standard calls for balancing, it is impossible to make sweeping generalizations
about how machine-learning algorithms would fare when used by agencies
making specific kinds of decisions. But at least one thing should be clear: No
agency should categorically rule out the use of machine-learning algorithms to
support adjudicatory decisions. Among the areas of the law in which “it
depends” would seem to be the best answer, this is definitely one.
Mathews’s first factor—the private interest at stake—is something entirely
exogenous to machine learning. But the last two factors could very well be
affected, perhaps dramatically so in some cases, by the use of algorithms. When
used to administer extremely large programs, machine learning could save the
government a substantial amount of money by forgoing pre-deprivation hearings, thereby significantly increasing the weight of the third factor in favor of
machine learning in any due process balancing. It is the second factor, then, that
will likely prove critical in determining the constitutional validity of automated
adjudications—namely, how well machine learning stacks up against alternative, non-machine-based procedures in terms of avoiding erroneous deprivations. Agencies will need to be justifiably confident that automatic algorithmic
deprivations have sufficiently low error rates to weigh heavily against the need
for pre-deprivation hearings before human officials. We cannot, of course,
determine ex ante what will constitute sufficiently low rates for all uses. Given
that the nature of a balancing test like that in Mathews requires case-by-case
determinations, we see little reason to write off all adjudicatory algorithms as
unable to conform to due process expectations. On the contrary, because
algorithms can reduce the possible introduction of negative features of human
judgment—such as prejudice, bias, and mistakes—we have reason to expect
that the use of machine learning by government can advance due process
values.154
2. Evaluating Adjudicatory Algorithms
When agencies seek to assess the superiority of their machine learning in
terms of error avoidance, the second Mathews factor, two conditions must be
met: (1) error rates truly representing the decision processes’ accuracy must be

153. Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
154. Cary Coglianese, Robot Regulators Could Eliminate Human Error, S.F. CHRON. (May 5, 2016),
http://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/Robot-regulators-could-eliminate-human-error-7396749.
php [https://perma.cc/WCH2-KNAB].
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available, and (2) those error rates must prove to be acceptable in the overall
balance of factors. The first of these two conditions should easily be met by
virtue of machine learning being a purely mathematical decision-making process. Unlike qualitative methods for determining the factual bases of deprivations, mathematical classification systems provide estimates of their error rates
before they are actually implemented; one can obtain from machine-learning
algorithms, for instance, a form of output called confusion tables, which show
various error rates in a test data set.155 Assuming some degree of similarity
between the test data and the population in which the algorithms will be
implemented, these error rates can be generalized to real-world adjudications.
The second condition, an error rate’s acceptability, might be determined by
reference to a body of case law that characterizes acceptable error rates for other
types of procedures. Relying on comparisons of error rates associated with other
procedures would be in line with courts’ overall emphasis, whenever possible in
applying the Mathews test, on quantitative estimates of error based on empirical
evidence rather than on abstract or hypothetical concepts of risk.156 Although
due process determinations will still be flexible and require case-by-case balancing, agencies could reasonably look to precedents about other procedures to
guide their decisions about algorithmic autonomy. If the courts typically look
favorably on conventional procedural mechanisms that have a certain level of
accuracy, then automatic, algorithm-based adjudications with similar error rates
should be likely to pass constitutional muster.
Looking to precedents will reveal, on the one hand, low error rates that courts
have deemed acceptable. In Mathews, the risk of erroneous deprivation, as
measured by reversals upon appeal, was 3.3 percent,157 and the Court noted that
with such a low error rate “[t]he potential value of an evidentiary hearing, or
even oral presentation to the decision maker, is substantially less in this context
than in Goldberg.”158 Error rates lower than 1 percent have been similarly
treated as acceptable.159 In General Electric Co. v. Jackson, the district court
even held that an error rate of 4.4 percent was deemed “an acceptable rate of
error,”160 notwithstanding the court’s recognition that “the private[] interest[s]
[were] significant.”161

155. See BERK, supra note 33, at 108–10. When predicting a binary outcome variable, these error
rates will represent false positives and false negatives, and error rates from regression applications of
machine learning will represent overestimates or underestimates. See id.
156. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 33 (D.D.C. 2009).
157. 424 U.S. 319, 346 n.29 (1976).
158. Id. at 344–45.
159. See, e.g., Gray Panthers v. Califano, 466 F. Supp. 1317, 1323 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting that an
error rate of less than 1 percent “is a small fraction of the 3.3% rate the Court in Mathews upheld as
consistent with due process”).
160. Gen. Elec. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (quoting Shands v. Tull, 602 F.2d 1156, 1160 (3d Cir.
1979)).
161. Id. at 38.

1188

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 105:1147

At the other end of the continuum, courts have concluded that high error rates
that represent predictions no better, or perhaps even worse, than guessing by
chance are unacceptable and necessitate additional due process protections to
reduce these rates. For example, error rates of 50 percent162 and 51.6 percent163
have been deemed a “substantial risk,”164 and an error rate of 74.6 percent has
been labeled “unacceptably high.”165
Between these extremes, court decisions reveal less agreement over the risk
that more moderate error rates pose, and, in some of these cases, the error rate is
not treated as a particularly weighty or controlling balancing factor at all.
An error rate of 30 percent, for example, was deemed to constitute “a very high
error rate for purposes of Mathews v. Eldridge,”166 although an 18.96 percent
error rate was considered a “slight”167 risk of error, despite, in a different case, a
court treating an error rate of 11.67 percent as a “high risk of error.”168 As a
result, despite the precision that judicial notice of error rates to two decimal
places might imply, no fixed percentage can be found in the case law demarcating a clean line between acceptable and unacceptable levels of error.
In addition to a lack of a clear, fixed threshold of acceptability, past precedents present another challenge in that reversal rates are not necessarily a
complete or accurate measure of error. In the particular context of Mathews, the
Court noted that the administrative review system “operated on an open-file
basis,”169 meaning that those denied disability benefits could, at any point
following their deprivations, submit new evidence that could result in additional
medical examinations. Individuals who availed themselves of these procedures
to have an initial denial changed were not included in the 3.3 percent reversal
rate because their cases were never appealed.170 Similarly, and relevant to
measurements in all scenarios, reversal rates may fail to capture those who are
erroneously denied benefits but who choose for various unrelated reasons not to
file an appeal that would lead to an evidentiary hearing and reversal. For these
reasons, the actual rate of “error” in administrative systems will presumably be
higher than indicated by a rate of reversal.171

162. Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1195 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29 (2010).
163. White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1255 n.12 (D. Conn. 1976).
164. Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1195.
165. 595 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (referencing Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493, 505, 512 (7th Cir. 2005)).
166. Markadonatos v. Village of Woodridge, 739 F.3d 984, 1001 (7th Cir. 2014) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting).
167. Graves v. Meystrik, 425 F. Supp. 40, 48–49 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
168. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 151 (1985) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (citing Foggs v. Block, 722
F.2d 933, 939 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding an error rate of 585 households out of 5,013 households, or 11.67
percent)).
169. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
170. Id. at 346 n.29.
171. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Mathews Court noted that, “[b]are statistics rarely provide a
satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking process.” Id. at 346.
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These deficiencies in measuring error risk based on reversal rates may pose a
challenge to an agency’s search for judicial guidance on automatic algorithmic
deprivations. Algorithms’ test-data error rates are mathematically computed in a
way that makes it difficult to compare them directly to the reversal rates
currently relied upon within the case law. Although the case law seems to
indicate that reversal rates under 5 percent should be sufficient to avoid the need
for pre-deprivation hearings, agencies will be unable to determine ex ante what
any particular algorithm’s mathematical error rate equates to in terms of a
reversal rate. As a more accurate estimate of the total error in a system will
likely be higher than any reversal rate, an algorithm’s error rate might be higher
too, even when reliance on the algorithm actually results in a less error-prone
process. Still, if an algorithm’s error rate itself fell below 5 percent, then
agencies relying on the algorithm for adjudication could presumably predict that
the courts would deem this rate to be acceptable.
If nothing else, agencies could structure algorithmic adjudication systems to
produce data on reversal rates. By incorporating a delay period between the
time when an algorithmic prediction is made and when any corresponding
deprivation of rights occurs, affected individuals or entities would have the
opportunity to request a hearing, thus generating over time some data on
reversals. These delay periods could accompany a phase-in or piloting of an
automated adjudicatory system, providing agencies with the data needed to
establish how their test-data error rates correspond with reversal rates. As long
as these error rates prove sufficiently low, we anticipate no categorical reason
why courts would reject adjudication by algorithm merely due to its digitized
and automated nature.
3. Cross-Examination of Adjudicatory Algorithms
Perhaps the more substantial due process question presented by automated
adjudication stems from how such a system would affect an aggrieved party’s
right to cross-examination. Claimants presumably should have a right to understand and provide comment on the design of any algorithm, as well as the
underlying data used.172 Unfortunately, it will seldom if ever be readily discernable why any particular prediction resulted from machine learning, and, consequently, it will not be easy to determine what evidence would be needed to

172. An agency could conceivably bias an algorithm in deliberate ways that could be exposed on
appeal. In many machine-learning algorithms, it is possible for an agency to set the algorithm’s cost
ratio, or the preferred ratio of false positives to false negatives, which in turn affects the corresponding
error rates. See BERK, supra note 33, at 139–45. Thus, an agency could potentially bias an algorithm to,
for example, have more error when predicting that someone should be deprived than when predicting
that someone should not be denied if the agency views not depriving someone as less costly than the
pre-deprivation hearing that would be necessary if that individual were deprived. Outside of the
administrative context, previous scholarship has discussed the difficulties faced in uncovering similar
hidden biases and value choices in algorithms applied to criminal justice. See Andrea Roth, Trial by
Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245, 1269–76 (2016).
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rectify errors.173 Any of the variables could have been predictively important
ones, and any of those variables could have been the one (or ones) that
contained the error. Probably the only meaningful way to identify errors would
be to conduct a proceeding in which an algorithm and its data are fully
explored. This could be accomplished through agency rulemaking establishing
an automated adjudicatory system in the first place and in specifying the
underlying algorithm’s parameters. It might also be raised in individual hearings
or appeals seeking to analyze separately an algorithm’s forecast in each case,
probing for sources of error in the data and specifications underlying those
individual predictions.174
Given that this thorough examination of algorithmic error will entail sophisticated deconstructions of data quality and methodology, few individual claimants will readily possess the mathematical and analytical ability to conduct such
an investigation without assistance.175 Even with the appointment of counsel, or
with a requirement that a hearing examiner effectively act as counsel, claimants
may not be able to receive a fair hearing about the choices embedded in and the
data used by algorithmic adjudication. Most potential counsel or agency hearing
examiners do not possess the necessary skills to interrogate machine learning
systems. An expert must have a good degree of statistical knowledge to
understand how, for example, variables’ importance values are interpreted and
what consequences those interpretations hold for the effects of possible erroneous variable measurements on predictions. Adjudicating by algorithm may thus
necessitate the establishment of a body of neutral and independent statistical
experts to provide oversight and review, or more likely a prior rulemaking
process informed by an expert advisory committee or subjected to a peer review
process. Fortunately, such procedural steps are well established and have been

173. One may contend that the kind of evidence that must be provided to rectify errors relates to the
underlying matter of fact in dispute and not to the method by which that underlying matter is estimated.
As previously discussed, however, machine learning will often be applied to make predictions about
risks not capable of being directly evidenced; if PHMSA orders the shutdown of a pipeline, for
instance, the issue disputed at a hearing will be whether that pipeline indeed posed a risk for future
failure, and the kind of physical evidence that could be presented at the hearing may not be capable of
demonstrating the pipeline’s lack of risk. Therefore, a pipeline operator in such a hearing will have to
provide evidence instead about the potential sources of error in the algorithm that was used initially to
predict the risk.
174. Outside the context of adjudicatory algorithms, previous scholarship has emphasized the need
for individuals to be able to challenge automated decisions rendered by corporate entities’ algorithms,
such as those engaged in credit scoring. See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Tom Baker &
Benedict G.C. Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial Services Industry, 103 IOWA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2017).
175. Courts have held that counsel may be required for individuals who lack the abilities to present
their case due to factors like low educational attainment or mental handicap. See, e.g., Smith v. Sec’y of
Health, Educ., & Welfare, 587 F.2d 857, 860–61 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Alamo v. Richardson,
355 F. Supp. 314, 316–17 (D.P.R. 1972). An alternative to providing counsel can be requiring that the
body administering the hearing effectively serve as counsel. See Gold v. Sec’y of Health, Educ., &
Welfare, 463 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1972).
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long used in other complex administrative matters.176
In the end, whether any particular algorithmic system will satisfy the standards of due process will depend on how well that system works and on the
adequate validation of its performance. But nothing in principle stands in the
way of satisfying the demands of due process, even for automated adjudication
by algorithm, especially given the flexibility courts have long granted agencies
in crafting adjudicatory procedures. Furthermore, given the well-established
biases and errors that can creep into human judgment, and recognizing that
machine-learning algorithms have demonstrated superiority over human decisions in other contexts,177 it is reasonable to conclude that agencies will be able
to satisfy the demands of due process even in the machine-learning era.178
C. ANTIDISCRIMINATION

As agencies face choices about how to design machine-learning algorithms in
the service of adjudication and rulemaking, they will need to decide what kinds
of variables should be included in the data these algorithms use to make
predictions. They may have at their disposal data on demographic variables
representing membership in legally protected classes, and inclusion of these
variables in algorithms could increase their predictions’ accuracy and potentially reduce disparities in accuracy across classes.179 But including them, and

176. See, e.g., U.S. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AVIATION RULEMAKING
COMMITTEE (2011), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/
UASARC-6172011.PDF [https://perma.cc/UQ4L-DTE5]. General procedures for advisory committees
are provided by the Federal Advisory Committee Act §§ 1–16, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 (2012). In addition, the
Office of Management and Budget has established guidelines for peer review. Final Information Quality
Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2,664 (Jan. 14, 2005).
177. See, e.g., Berk, Forecasting Domestic Violence, supra note 104; Kriegler & Berk, supra
note 51.
178. See supra note 104.
179. Imagine, for instance, that for a given protected attribute a data set contains information about
two classes of individuals. One class is larger and has, on average, more “advantageous” outcomes in
terms of the output variable, however defined. The other class is smaller and has, on average, less
advantageous outcomes. If an algorithm were ignorant of or blind to the class identities of individuals
in this data set, the algorithm would generate one classification rule that would generally perform more
accurately for the majority class (simply because it is larger), causing less accurate predictions for the
minority class. If, however, this algorithm explicitly took into account individuals’ class memberships,
it could generate two different classification rules, one for each class, allowing for more accurate
predictions overall and, most pertinently, for the minority class. There may, of course, be instances in
which the increases in overall accuracy and decreases in accuracy disparities are negligible. Particularly, nearly equally accurate predictions may result in data sets lacking class-related variables but
containing many other variables that are highly correlated with class membership, provided that the
data set is sufficiently large. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CAL. L. REV. 671, 695 (2016). This finding may naturally prompt the question of whether including such
proxy variables capable of recapitulating class membership raises equal protection concerns, and,
indeed, this question has been considered outside the context of algorithmic decision making. See
generally Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014). We do not address proxy variables in any depth in this Article
because, as will be seen, the reasoning underlying our conclusion about class-related variables
necessarily yields the same conclusion for sets of proxy variables.
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then basing action on the resulting predictions, raises serious concerns about
illegal discrimination, especially if those predictions lead to differential effects
on members of a protected class. As a White House report on big data has
warned, “[p]owerful algorithms can unlock value in the vast troves of information available . . . but also raise the potential of encoding discrimination in
automated decisions.”180 In this section, we take up the question of whether
inclusion of class-related input variables in federal agencies’ algorithms would
render them unconstitutional for equal protection reasons. We find that, although consideration of suspect class membership is almost universally struck
down for contravening equal protection in traditional decision-making processes, quantitative or otherwise, some of the unique attributes of how machine
learning operates may shield agencies from a finding of unconstitutionality. This
is not to say that the use of machine-learning algorithms by federal agencies
will always be unproblematic under equal protection; on the contrary, the use of
algorithms could be driven by manifest, easily-discoverable animus or discriminatory intent as much as any other decision process. Our suggestion is simply
that potential equal protection challenges to agency use of machine learning will
likely face a high bar if officials in these agencies employ algorithms responsibly and in good faith, building a suitable record to demonstrate the propriety of
their design and use.
Under the Fifth Amendment, agencies must respect the equal protection
rights of those affected by their actions.181 Federal agencies, though, do not
violate those rights “solely because [an action] has a . . . disproportionate impact” on a protected class, such as race or religion.182 Rather, to show a
violation of equal protection by the federal government, “[a] purpose to discriminate must be present.”183 In other words, agency action that purposefully
discriminates based on a protected class—that is, action that engages in dispa-

180. U.S. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 45
(2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_ privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T7AN-BU8P]. Similar concerns over the potential for discrimination when algorithms
are applied to big data have also been voiced in the press. See, e.g., Katherine Noyes, Will Big Data
Help End Discrimination—or Make It Worse?, FORTUNE (Jan. 15, 2015, 3:16 PM), http://fortune.com/
2015/01/15/will-big-data-help-end-discrimination-or-make-it-worse [https://perma.cc/8PPY-7Y3A]; Michael Schrage, Big Data’s Dangerous New Era of Discrimination, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 29, 2014),
https://hbr.org/2014/01/big-datas-dangerous-new-era-of-discrimination [https://perma.cc/Y7MEHYLN].
181. Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination by the
states, the Warren Court held that the concepts of due process and equal protection “are not mutually
exclusive” and that “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of” the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Accordingly, analysis of
discrimination claims under the Fifth Amendment mirrors that of equal protection analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and much of the case law we discuss in this Part arises under the latter
provision of the Constitution.
182. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
183. Id. (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1945)).
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rate treatment—will be legally suspect and subject to heightened scrutiny.184 At
the end of this section, we will briefly suggest that regulatory decisions made by
machine learning could in many instances withstand heightened scrutiny, but of
course we recognize that evaluation under such a heightened standard of review
will ultimately be highly fact-dependent. Our principal argument in this section
is that algorithms that include variables indicating protected class membership
will seldom if ever trigger heightened scrutiny, at least in the absence of any
explicit showing of discriminatory intent or animus. Equal protection challenges
to machine learning will, in short, likely fail at the first step of analysis that
demands a finding that algorithms that include or analyze class-related variables
are intentionally discriminatory.
1. Suspect Classifications
Because we assume that there will rarely exist direct evidence that a decision
maker—in this case, an algorithm’s programmers or their superiors—consciously intended to discriminate on the basis of a protected class, evidence of
any such intent would need to be found indirectly and circumstantially. We will
address this kind of search for inferences of discrimination in the next section,
where we explain why machine learning is unlikely to give rise to such
inferences. But first we take up the typical way that claimants alleging disparate
treatment succeed in showing that governmental action deserves heightened
scrutiny: namely, by demonstrating that an agency action involves a suspect
classification. Such classifications are automatically subject to heightened
scrutiny.185
Courts will likely find it difficult to conclude that agency algorithms that
analyze class-related variables entail suspect classifications.186 For one thing,
the Supreme Court has never clearly defined what constitutes a suspect classification.187 Its attitude has been relatively consistent when the only variable
184. Racial discrimination, for instance, is subject to strict scrutiny review. See, e.g., Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213 (1995). Disparate treatment on the basis of sex, however,
is generally considered subject to intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
185. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 235; Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
186. It should be made clear that the use of “classification” to refer to the goal of a machine-learning
algorithm must be disentangled from its use to refer to how the race-related information is treated
within an algorithm. Scholars have suggested that, because a machine-learning algorithm has classification as its goal, the inclusion of class-related variables in such an algorithm necessarily renders it a
legally harmful suspect classification. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 179, at 695. As our subsequent
discussions will show, however, what matters for determining the level of judicial scrutiny is not just
whether the goal of a government decision-making process is classificatory in overall nature, but
whether within that process individuals are classified by their class memberships, such that being a
member of one class is advantageous or disadvantageous when compared to being a member of another
class.
187. See Stephen Menendian, What Constitutes a “Racial Classification”?: Equal Protection Doctrine Scrutinized, 24 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 81, 82 (2014) (“The Supreme Court has, to date, not
provided a definition of the term ‘racial classification.’ Increasingly a term of art, the Court has not
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contributing to a governmental decision is membership in a protected class and
where such membership universally leads to disadvantaged outcomes; such
decision schemes are clearly suspect classifications and must be subjected to
heightened scrutiny.188 Beyond such manifestly problematic scenarios, the Court’s
criteria for suspect classifications have been murkier. Still, the Court has
subjected to heightened scrutiny decision processes in which membership in a
protected class was but one of many variables considered by government
decision makers.189 It might therefore be assumed that any inclusion of class
membership, or even the mere consideration of a protected class, would suffice
to conclude that a decision-making process depends on a suspect classification.190 If this were the case, then any machine-learning algorithm that analyzes
data containing variables for membership in a protected class would surely
receive heightened scrutiny. Yet, as others have suggested, governmental actions
that are class-conscious but do not classify on the basis of group membership
may be exempt from heightened scrutiny.191 In other words, government might
consider a suspect class without necessarily resulting in a classification. How
class membership is considered, beyond merely the fact that it is, can matter
greatly when it comes to determining if a government action rests on a suspect
classification.
Previous scholarship has put forward five such aspects of a classification: “(1)
an official government label (2) proclaiming or identifying the [class] of (3) a
particular individual, (4) which is then the basis for allocating benefits or
imposing burdens (5) on the person classified.”192 The machine-learning algorithms we envision would certainly contain an official government label indicating particular individuals’ class memberships. It is less clear, however, that
these algorithms would allocate benefits or burdens on the basis of class
membership in the same way as have almost every decision scheme that to date
has been subjected to heightened scrutiny by courts. Decision schemes previously reviewed by the courts have universally exhibited what we label “categorialways been careful about its usage or consistent in its application.” (citations omitted)); Reva B.
Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1542 (2004) (“American antidiscrimination law has no determinate
criteria for deciding what practices are group-based classifications, and while courts sometimes
articulate such criteria, they often apply them inconsistently.”); Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect
Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 138 (2011) (“The Supreme Court has not provided a
coherent explanation for precisely what factors trigger heightened scrutiny.”).
188. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
189. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251–57 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
312–16 (2003).
190. Indeed, scholars have sometimes made this claim. For example, Sonja Starr stated that, in the
2013 iteration of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, “the Supreme Court . . . applied heightened
constitutional scrutiny to the mere consideration of constitutionally suspect factors” in the university’s
undergraduate admissions process. Starr, supra note 179, at 864 (discussing Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)).
191. See Menendian, supra note 187, at 91–95; Stephen M. Rich, Inferred Classifications, 99 VA. L.
REV. 1525, 1579–86 (2013).
192. Menendian, supra note 187, at 102 (citations omitted).
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cally different treatment” based on class membership. In the past, when an
individual’s race has been factored into a decision, being a member of a given
race has caused individuals of that race to have their predicted outcomes
affected in a consistently and categorically different way than individuals of
another race. In these situations, being a member of a given race has always
been, across individuals of that race, either advantageous or disadvantageous
when compared to being a member of a different race.193 Yet with machine
learning, many, if not most, algorithms will not lead to categorically different
treatment, even when they include consideration of variables for race and other
protected classes.
Concern about categorically different treatment on the basis of class membership underlies many Supreme Court decisions under the Equal Protection
Clause. In Gratz v. Bollinger, white undergraduate applicants were categorically
denied twenty points awarded to students belonging to underrepresented minority groups in a point-based admissions system, resulting in a suspect classification.194 In Grutter v. Bollinger, a law school used a more holistic admissions
process that did not distribute points, but this process was still deemed a suspect
classification; when race did factor into an admissions decision, membership in
an underrepresented minority group was universally given a degree of preference for admission over lack of such membership.195 The Court has similarly
held that heightened scrutiny is warranted due to categorically different treatment arising from a public school board’s method for determining teacher
layoffs that gave preferential treatment to minority teachers.196 Another school
district’s process of assigning students to schools triggered heightened scrutiny
because, for each school, it gave preference to students of certain races whose
assignment would place the school’s racial makeup closer to that of the school’s

193. Going forward, we discuss categorically different treatment of class membership in contexts
where one class is advantaged—it is awarded benefits or allowed to avoid burdens—and another is
disadvantaged. But the underlying conceptual formulation of categorically different treatment also
applies to instances in which the attached benefits or burdens of governmental treatment are less
evident. Take, for instance, Johnson v. California, which concerned the assignment of prisoners only to
cells with cell mates of the same race; no prisoners of particular races were burdened any more than
others, but the Court explicitly stated that allowing this action to escape strict scrutiny “ignores our
repeated command that ‘racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to
burden or benefit the races equally.’” Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 (2005) (quoting Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 651 (1993)). It should be clear, though, that this assignment of prisoners by race
nonetheless involved categorically different treatment, even if not categorically different allocation of
burdens or benefits; all prisoners of a given race were assigned to certain cells, whereas all prisoners of
another race were assigned to different cells. Id. at 502 (“In fact, the CDC has admitted that the chances
of an inmate being assigned a cellmate of another race are ‘[p]retty close’ to zero percent.” (citations
omitted)).
194. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 266.
195. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318–20 (2003). A similarly holistic admissions process
was the subject of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin; when considered, underrepresented minority
status was categorically given preference over non-minority status to remedy the university’s lack of “a
‘critical mass’ of minority students.” Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416.
196. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273–74 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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district.197 In each of these cases, a public decision process treated membership
in certain races as advantageous, while treating membership in others as
disadvantageous.
These are just a few examples, but they demonstrate the pervasiveness of
categorically different treatment of class membership. Traditionally, taking race
or other protected class characteristics into account meant drawing a distinction
that leads to one class being advantaged to some degree over another class by
being more likely to receive benefits or avoid burdens. The Court’s reasoning in
its equal protection cases underscores how doctrinally important this categorically different treatment of class membership is to finding a reliance on a
suspect classification. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Supreme Court applied strict
scrutiny precisely because the legislative scheme gave and withheld “preference
based on” ethnic membership.198 Similarly, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, the Court stated that the challenged teacher layoffs “operate[d]
against whites and in favor of certain minorities, and therefore constitute[d] a
classification based on race.”199 More recently, the Court emphasized its concern in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin about a state “considering racial
minority status as a positive or favorable factor in a university’s admissions
process.”200 The Court reasoned that “[t]he principle of equal protection admits
no ‘artificial line of a “two-class theory”’ that ‘permits the recognition of special
wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others.’”201 In
other words, equal protection law singles out for heightened scrutiny those
classifications that arise when government draws lines that categorically favor
some classes and disfavor others.202
What makes explicit consideration of class membership odious and offensive
to equal protection principles is not just the government officials’ consideration
of race and other protected classes, but their use of class status as part of a
classification, when a membership in one class is consistently treated as advantageous or disadvantageous compared to membership in another class. When it
comes to the use of machine-learning algorithms, however, consideration of
class membership will not necessarily, or even often, give rise to categorically
different treatment. We can expect that most machine-learning applications will
be used to forecast complex phenomena—such as tax fraud or disability eligibility—that are not easily predicted by standard, less powerful, statistical techniques. Such complex phenomena are complex precisely because their causes
are not uniform and homogenous across the population. When machine learning
is applied to predict such phenomena, its nonparametric nature and incorpora-

197. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709–17 (2007).
198. 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (plurality opinion).
199. 476 U.S. at 273–74.
200. 133 S. Ct. at 2417.
201. Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
202. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 498 (7th ed. 2013) (stating suspect classifications are those where “the government has drawn [a] line between . . . favored and disfavored groups”).
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tion of multidimensional interaction effects allow this heterogeneity to be
manifested—and more fully exploited for predictive benefit.203 What this means
for equal protection analysis is that if machine-learning algorithms incorporate
an input variable representing individual membership in a particular class, it is
highly unlikely that the effect of that variable on predicted outcomes will be
consistently advantageous or disadvantageous for the multitude of individuals
in that class. Such algorithms will be designed, after all, to optimize for
accuracy in making predictions of fraud or benefits eligibility, not for giving
preferential treatment based on race or other class characteristics. A learning
algorithm will generally be able to improve its accuracy through more data and
additional variables of all types. The forecasts an algorithm generates will likely
support favorable treatment for some members of a class and unfavorable
treatment for other members of that same class, as these forecasts depend on
complex, non-linear interactions of multiple variables.204
In sum, determining that machine-learning algorithms create a suspect classification will hardly be a clear-cut task, even when government agencies include
class-related variables in their data sets. Until now, explicit consideration of
individuals’ memberships in protected classes has virtually always been labeled
as a classification because of the categorically different treatment that accompanies such consideration. We recognize that, for this reason, some courts may
instinctually incline toward treating as a suspect classification the mere consideration of class-related variables by learning algorithms. Yet what truly makes
such consideration a classification, and thus constitutionally suspect, is the
attendant attachment of advantage to one class, and of disadvantage to another,
by the officials who are collecting and analyzing data in traditional ways—an
attachment that will neither necessarily nor usually be present with the use of
machine learning. The courts’ heightened scrutiny of suspect classifications
exists not to prevent any and all governmental considerations of class characteristics. Rather, it exists to constrain governments from stereotyping and treating
individuals as if they were “defined by” their status within a particular class.205

203. See supra Section I.A.
204. Furthermore, even if one nonetheless believed that consistent, homogenous effects of class
membership had resulted, determining so would be impossible due to the inability to open the black
box and see exactly what functional forms have resulted and exactly how variables have interacted. In
other words, even if all members of a class were ex post subjected to the same outcome or treated in
one manner, it would be difficult to conclude that this was because of the inclusion of class-related
variables in the algorithmic analysis. If even an algorithm’s designers cannot know how class-related
variables might be affecting the outcomes, we find it hard to imagine a court could determine that a
government agency that relied on such an algorithm to obtain more accurate predictions was intentionally discriminating on the basis of a protected class.
205. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788–89 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[School authorities] are free to devise race-conscious measures to address
the problem [of diversity] in a general way and without treating each student in different fashion solely
on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race. . . . These mechanisms are race conscious but do
not lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined
by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.”).
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Traditional schemes, such as admitting minority students or retaining minority
teachers, invariably do stereotype when they categorically assign a different
weight in the government’s decision analysis based on class membership. By
contrast, machine-learning algorithms, especially those we have in mind for use
in solving complex forecasting problems, are far less likely to do so. As courts
begin to encounter governmental use of artificial intelligence, they should
recognize that “classification” is not a synonym for explicit consideration of an
individual’s class membership206—at least not when applied to learning algorithms that analyze data that may contain class-related variables. Machinelearning algorithms do not operate by giving categorically different treatment
based on class membership. As such, absent animus or other explicit intentionality about class in the selection of optimization parameters, machine learning’s
use should not contravene the foundational principles underlying the Supreme
Court’s invocation of suspect classifications.
2. Inferring Discriminatory Intent
Even if algorithms do not implicate suspect classifications, opponents of
certain machine-learning applications might still argue that they should be
subjected to heightened scrutiny by invoking circumstantial evidence to convince courts to infer discriminatory intent.207 Such opponents might claim that
the mere inclusion of a variable such as race in an algorithmic analysis, even if
it does not result in consistently advantageous or disadvantageous predictions,
still demonstrates an a priori intent to give disparate treatment or produce a
disparate outcome. They might argue that conscious decisions by a regulatory
agency to include such variables in a machine-learning analysis represent the
kind of “specific . . . events leading up to the challenged decision”208 that
provide circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. Whatever surface
appeal such arguments might hold, we think they will almost surely fail. In the
context of machine learning, the black box nature of this analysis means that the
act of including a variable does not by itself provide much insight into what an
algorithm user might have hoped to gain by including that variable; additional
direct or circumstantial evidence would be needed to connect the inclusion of a
variable to discriminatory intent.
Yet perhaps machine-learning opponents will argue that government officials
should reasonably foresee that the inclusion of variables related to a protected

206. The need for clearer recognition of the difference between classification and explicit consideration seems more than just theoretical. For example, as others have noted, in his opinion in Parents
Involved, Chief Justice Roberts appears to use “race-conscious” synonymously with “racial classification.” Rich, supra note 191, at 1571 n.239.
207. Such circumstantial evidence may include “historical background of the decision,” the sequence of events leading up to the decision, the extent to which there is a departure from normal
procedures, and the legislative history tracking deliberations by decision makers. Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1977).
208. Id. at 267.
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class could create a disparate impact, and thus officials’ persistence in including
those variables evidences intent to discriminate.209 Such a claim would be
dubious. Given how machine-learning analysis works on a black-box basis, it is
virtually impossible for anyone to know a priori what a given variable’s likely
importance in the algorithm will be or what its ultimate effects will be on any
disparities of predictions.210 Many machine-learning algorithms incorporate
stochastic processes that randomly decide if and when a given variable factors
into the classifications, and there are often complex and unpredictable interaction effects between different variables that may cause the inclusion of a
protected-trait-related variable to decrease, rather than increase, the disparity of
outcomes. Even after an algorithm is implemented, its black-box nature prevents anyone from determining the effects of that variable on any resulting
disparity of the outcomes—whether it may have worsened or lessened those
disparities.211
Machine-learning opponents might attempt, alternatively, to argue that, although disparate impacts cannot be expected a priori, a decision maker with
discriminatory intent could run an algorithm multiple times with different
variables included, determine ex post whether including a variable representing
a protected trait produces greater disparity of outcomes, and then choose to
implement an algorithm including such a variable if it produces relatively
greater disparity.212 The legitimacy of such a claim, however, is questionable
due to the unknowable generalizability of the outcomes of any single machinelearning analysis. It is common practice to build an algorithm using a random
sample of an entire data set (called the training data), and to then evaluate the
algorithm’s predictions in a different random sample of that data set (called the
test data).213 This allows an analyst to obtain some sense of how the algorithm
may perform in new realizations of the data, as changes may result whenever an
algorithm is used in novel predictive endeavors.

209. The Court has also allowed such foreseeability of disparate impact to serve as circumstantial
evidence of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464
(1979); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278–79 (1979).
210. See supra Part I.
211. Some machine-learning algorithms are capable of producing a type of output called partial
dependence plots, which show the average functional (albeit not causal) relationship between a given
predictor variable and the outcome holding all other variables constant. See, e.g., D. Richard Cutler et
al., Random Forests for Classification in Ecology, 88 ECOLOGY 2783 (2007). These plots do not,
however, give one any insight into the effect of a given variable on the disparity of the ultimate
classifications.
212. Even in such a scenario, one could not know whether it was indeed the inclusion of a given
variable that produced the differences in disparity due to the stochastic nature of many machinelearning algorithms. That being said, if one’s data set is sufficiently large and does not contain much
noise, then one should not expect significantly different outcomes between iterations of an algorithm.
Thus, if one were to observe that algorithms including a given variable resulted in significantly
disparate impacts, then it could perhaps be assumed that the variable was responsible. However, this is
data-dependent, making its likelihood difficult to quantify.
213. See BERK, supra note 33, at 31.
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One problem common to any statistical analysis is that the analyst cannot
know how close the test data are to new realizations of data and thus cannot
predict how a model or algorithm will perform in the “real world.” If the entire
data set from which the test data were randomly sampled was itself a random
sample from the real world population, then the test data and novel realizations
may well be similar. But it is unlikely, even if an agency is working with
randomly sampled data, for the population from which data are sampled to be
the same population for which generalizations are desired to be made. Take, for
instance, an IRS algorithm used to predict tax fraud. This algorithm’s underlying data may have come from prior years’ audits and their outcomes, but that
population is not the same as the population of interest, which would presumably comprise all individuals filing tax returns—not just those audited—in the
present year. Temporal differences between test data and real-world data can
matter, as differences in the economy between prior years and the current year
may impact the likelihood of individuals to engage in fraudulent tax practices.
Thus, even if an agency analyst were to choose an algorithm that included a
variable representing a protected class, such as race, a disparate impact is not
foreseeable due to the inability of knowing the likelihood that disparate outcomes observed in test data would be borne out in real-world data. For these
reasons, plaintiffs attempting to show circumstantial evidence of discriminatory
intent in the use of machine learning will surely face a steep uphill climb.
3. Withstanding Standards of Review
Thus far, we have explained why administrative agencies’ use of machinelearning algorithms that analyze class-related variables are unlikely to give rise
to heightened scrutiny. Despite a lack of clear, settled judicial guidance in this
area, it seems safe to conclude that learning algorithms’ mathematical properties
likely will preclude the courts from labeling the use of protected-class data in
these algorithms as a suspect classification or inferring any circumstantial
discriminatory intent. Yet if a court nevertheless did subject agencies’ machinelearning tools to heightened scrutiny, this does not automatically mean that
courts will find that the agencies have denied individuals of the equal protection
of the law. Whether a decision process deemed to be discriminatory could
survive heightened scrutiny will depend to a great degree on factors exogenous
to the nature of machine learning—specifically, the nature of the government
objective and the state interest motivating the process.214 Presumably, regulatory agencies that use machine learning in the service of policy objectives such
as public health protection or market stability would have strong arguments that
they are seeking to advance compelling state interests.

214. To survive intermediate scrutiny, intentionally discriminatory processes must serve “important
governmental objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Under strict scrutiny, “classification[s] ‘must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.’” Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion) (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
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Although a full consideration of how applications of machine learning would
fare under heightened scrutiny will be highly fact dependent, government
should be able to overcome at least one aspect of heightened scrutiny analysis—
the prohibition on “overbroad generalizations” about different classes.215 This
specific equal protection concern has been raised in the context of evidencebased sentencing in which checklists used to inform criminal sentencing include
gender-coding variables weighted on the basis of past regression analyses.216
For example, Sonja Starr has put forward a compelling argument for why, in
that context, inclusion of class-related variables unconstitutionally capitalizes
on overbroad generalizations about class membership; checklists take gender
into account only by assigning uniform weights to one gender, thereby subjecting all individuals to group-based treatment instead of treating them truly as
individuals, “a core value embodied by the Equal Protection Clause.”217 This
criticism, though, is unlikely to carry the same weight in the context of
administrative agencies’ use of machine-learning algorithms. If gender, for
instance, were included in an algorithm, it would not be the case that, say, all
females would have their predictions affected in the same way, simply because
they were female. Rather, the effects of gender on the predictions would vary
across individuals and would depend on interactions between the gender variable and all other input variables, effects that would again be unpredictable and
heterogeneous across individuals.218
Opponents might argue that machine learning nonetheless creates a problematic statistical generalization of its own because algorithms generate predictions
about what individuals will do based on what similar individuals have done in
the past.219 Admittedly, machine learning does rely on analysis of training data
sets; however, such reliance on the past behavior of similar individuals occurs at
a fundamentally different and much more individualized level in the algorithmic
context than in the context of checklists. In the latter, generalizations are made
about what females as a broad group have historically done. In the former,
generalizations will be made about the past behaviors of, say, females of a
certain age, with a certain educational background, living in a particular area,
paying a given amount of taxes, driving a certain type of car, and so forth. Thus,
even though Starr has provided compelling reasons to believe that checklist
generalizations may be unconstitutionally “overbroad,” the same assertion of
excessive breadth will be much less tenable with respect to machine-learning
algorithms.
We reiterate that challenges to agencies’ algorithms will not likely reach the
stage where these considerations will be relevant. The usual rationales for
heightened scrutiny are not likely to apply to machine learning. Accordingly, the
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
See Starr, supra note 179.
Starr, supra note 179, at 827.
See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section I.A.
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applicable standard for equal protection purposes will likely be rational basis
review, which “generally results in the validation of state action.”220 Rational
basis review merely requires that a governmental action be “rationally related to
furthering a legitimate state interest.”221 Assuming that the governmental interest to which an agency’s machine-learning algorithm is applied is legitimate, it
should be quite difficult for that algorithm to be struck down on equal protection
grounds. An algorithm’s objective function will itself provide a concrete, mathematical embodiment of the agency’s goal, sufficient to demonstrate a rational
relationship between the algorithm and the governmental interest at stake.
One of the few ways in which government actions can be struck down under
rational basis review is through the finding of a motivating animus toward a
certain group.222 The Supreme Court has yet to offer clear guidance for determining the presence of animus or how exactly such a presence should affect judicial
review.223 Nevertheless, we can surmise that animus can be found either
through direct evidence or via inference.224 Direct evidence typically takes the
form of statements, whether by legislators225 or private individuals whose views
are given effect by challenged actions,226 showing sentiments of hostility,
stereotype, bias, or bigotry. Such manifest indications of animus might well
surround specific uses of machine-learning algorithms, but nothing unique
about machine learning makes it any more vulnerable to explicit animus than
any other decision-making process or governmental action.
Claims of indirect inferences of animus might conceivably be advanced by
calling attention to disparate outcomes. Yet, at least with respect to machine
learning, any such inferences would be hard to justify. Although animus has not
been unambiguously defined, inferences of it would likely entail making a
situation-dependent search for some kind of “logical connection” between the
consideration of class and the government interest being served—the absence of
which might plausibly support an inference of animus.227 If an algorithm’s
supplementary, diagnostic output somehow indicated that a class-related variable was relatively important for the accuracy of the algorithm’s predictions,

220. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 755–56 (2011). By contrast,
strict scrutiny has been famously described as being “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
221. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curiam).
222. See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 889 (2012).
223. See id. at 924–30; Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of Marriage
Equality, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 204, 205–06 (2013).
224. Pollvogt, supra note 222, at 926–29.
225. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (discussing statements by
legislators expressing a desire to exclude “hippies” from food stamp programs).
226. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (describing how a court’s decision to take
custody away from a mother who remarried a man of a different race gave effect to private biases
against interracial marriages).
227. Pollvogt, supra note 222, at 927 (discussing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432 (1985)).
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then it would appear easy to claim that that variable is connected to a valid
governmental interest—an interest in taking action aimed at a legitimate purpose in the most efficient and accurate way possible. Alternatively, if a classrelated variable could be shown to be not predictively important, then the
consideration of class would likely not be driving the discrimination complained of, but rather it would be other, non-class-related variables that would
underlie the outcomes. Opponents of machine learning might argue that these
other variables form, in combination, a proxy for class, and this could be true,
but then the inclusion of those variables would carry the same logical connection to the government’s interest as would the inclusion of important classrelated variables; the non-class-related variables would be contributing noticeably
to the algorithm’s accuracy. For these reasons, even when some evidence might
be put forward as to the predictive power of certain variables, it is unlikely that
agencies’ algorithms will be particularly vulnerable to indirect inferences of
animus that could lead them to be struck down under rational basis review.
Another potential argument opponents might make is that animus arises if an
agency implements an algorithm and finds that it yields vastly disproportionate
outcomes for individuals of a particular class, but then the agency fails to take
any steps to alleviate these disparate outcomes.228 After all, a series of novel
statistical methods are emerging that can minimize the disparate impact of
algorithms.229 These methods, though, come at the expense of forecasting
accuracy, which means that an agency’s failure to adopt them may not necessarily imply animus. The agency may simply be seeking to ensure that accurate
predictions underlie its actions. Furthermore, any steps an agency might take to
rectify disparate impacts after an algorithm’s implementation could itself constitute unconstitutional disparate treatment.230

228. It should also be noted, if the class in question is a constitutionally suspect one, then a similar
argument could perhaps be advanced to show circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, as
discussed earlier in this section.
229. See, e.g., Toshihiro Kamishima et al., Fairness-Aware Classifier with Prejudice Remover
Regularizer, in MACHINE LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY IN DATABASES 35–50 (Peter A. Flach, Tijl
De Bie & Nello Cristianini eds., 2012) (describing an approach known as regularization, which is akin
to mathematically punishing the algorithm for making vastly disparate classifications); Sorelle Friedler
et al., Certifying and Removing Disparate Impact 10–11, Presented at the NIPS workshop on Fairness,
Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning (2014), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.3756v1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y967-BF56] (describing a data-altering approach to reduce disparate outcomes by
what amounts, roughly speaking, to adding noise to the data).
230. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). In Ricci, the Court held that, in the context of
Title VII’s prohibition of disparate impacts, decision processes may be modified ex post to minimize
their disparate impacts only if the decision maker has a “strong basis in evidence to believe [the
decision maker] will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious,
discriminatory action.” Id. at 585. Admittedly, this ruling does not directly address the scenario we have
raised in this Article, in which the feared equal protection violation would result from a prohibition not
of disparate impacts but of animus. Nonetheless, the Court’s general hesitancy to allow ex post
disparate treatment calls into question whether ex post rectifications of an algorithm’s disparate impacts
would be permissible.
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Overall, our analysis indicates that agencies seeking to use machine learning
to advance their public missions should not be put off by the potential for equal
protection challenges.231 We expect that the courts will permit these agencies to
include class-related variables in their algorithms for the sake of accuracy and
even for trying to mitigate disparate impacts. Although the inclusion of race and
other class characteristics in decision making supported by machine learning
may seem to run afoul of the Court’s historical aversion to explicit considerations of protected classes, we have explained why the algorithmic consideration of class, unlike the consideration in traditional decision processes, is
unlikely to yield categorically different treatment based on class membership.
Agencies’ algorithms are unlikely to be deemed suspect classifications triggering heightened scrutiny. Due to the distinctive mathematical properties of
machine learning, agencies will also likely escape heightened scrutiny based on
circumstantial evidence of intent. Absent direct evidence of animus, machine
learning should be easily sustained under rational basis review. Even if subjected to heightened scrutiny, machine learning should, at least in some settings,
also withstand challenge.
Our conclusions about agencies’ ability to use machine learning in ways that
avoid equal protection problems should hardly be construed as giving our
blessing to the careless or indiscriminate use of machine learning. Principles of
good government still necessitate, whenever feasible, the avoidance of possible
discriminatory outcomes, even when such steps are not demanded by the

231. In reaching this conclusion, we have noted several uncertainties that exist, from a lack of clarity
surrounding the meaning of “suspect classification” to the uncertain acceptability of ex post modifications of algorithms with disparate impacts. Such uncertainties are representative of the broader ferment
that has characterized, and continues to characterize, equal protection doctrine, and it is in the context
of this ferment that our conclusion should be understood. Perhaps these difficulties in obtaining clarity
about the meaning of equal protection are not due to any easily rectifiable inadequacies in law, but
simply to the problem of defining, in a more normative sense, what equality actually means. For
example, many conceptions of equality rest on the notion that “persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.” F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). But some scholarship has
argued that such a statement is circular and devoid of any real moral thrust; the only coherent way to
define two individuals as “being alike” may not be to say that they are alike in any empirical way, but to
say that they are morally alike, in that they should be treated alike. But then a determination of who
should be treated alike is external to equality and must be derived from conceptions of rights or other
moral principles. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543, 547 (1982).
This difficulty of defining equality has practical implications not only for understanding equal protection doctrine but also for the ways that agencies should implement machine learning to counter
potential problems of unfairness. Mathematical definitions of equality must be grounded in a moral
definition of equality to be responsive to moral concerns about discrimination. Cf. Sorelle A. Friedler
et al., On the (Im)possibility of Fairness, ARXIV:1609.07236 [CS.CY] (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.
07236v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/225Y-LPAE] (discussing how multiple quantitative measures of algorithmic fairness exist but rely on unstated, and often incompatible, assumptions about fairness); Kory D.
Johnson et al., Impartial Predictive Modeling: Ensuring Fairness in Arbitrary Models, ARXIV:
1608.00528 [STAT.ME] (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.00528v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5QW-RY2U]
(“The literature lacks a serious discussion of the philosophical components of fairness and how they
should be operationalized in statistics. Doing so will require a spectrum of models to be defined,
because fairness is a complicated philosophical topic.”).
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Constitution. Indeed, one important reason for agency experimentation with
machine learning is to find ways to reduce or eliminate the errors and biases that
creep into human decisions. Although agency officials should be fully cognizant
of potential equal protection objections to their efforts to engage in algorithmic
adjudication or robotic rulemaking, these legal risks appear quite manageable
and should hardly stand in the way of responsible attempts to use machine
learning, especially when doing so will reduce discrimination that would otherwise be introduced by human decision makers and their often inescapable,
sometimes unconscious, prejudices.232
D. TRANSPARENCY

Up to this point, we have considered choices that agencies will face when
deciding to implement algorithmic tools. Now we turn to the question of how
could, and should, regulators ensure proper transparency about their choices.
Some observers already fear that an era of artificial intelligence may render too
much of society and its workings opaque.233 The legitimacy of agencies’
choices about algorithms will therefore depend on accountability and transparency.234 Principles of transparency undergird much of administrative law, finding expression in statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act235 and
various requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act.236 Taken together, these statutes provide a fundamental “means for citizens to know ‘what
their Government is up to.’”237 The legitimacy of rules issued by administrative

232. See Coglianese, supra note 154; see also Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (describing how discriminatory effects of algorithms may result not from
their black-box natures, which are often more neutral than potentially biased human decision makers,
but from historical human biases baked into data sets). Human biases can manifest themselves in
qualitative decision making and in traditional quantitative decision making, like regression analysis.
Regression analysis is more susceptible to tacit bias because it is driven by theories about how
individuals are likely to behave. A recent ProPublica report documents one form of disparate impacts
from a traditional risk assessment algorithm. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May
23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/VAF3-XQEV]. Although the exact nature of the COMPAS algorithm at the center of
the ProPublica report is proprietary and thus publicly unavailable, it does not seem to be a modern
machine-learning algorithm but rather a “theory-guided instrument[].” Tim Brennan & William L.
Oliver, The Emergence of Machine Learning Techniques in Criminology: Implications of Complexity in
Our Data and in Research Questions, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 551, 559 (2013); see also Tim
Brennan et al., Evaluating the Predictive Validity of the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment System,
36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 21, 24 (2009) (noting how COMPAS models “use logistic regression, survival
analysis, and bootstrap classification methods”).
233. See, e.g., John Danaher, The Threat of Algocracy: Reality, Resistance and Accommodation, 29
PHIL. & TECH. 245 (2016); Felten, supra note 20.
234. Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 924, 926 (2009).
235. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
236. Id. §§ 552–553.
237. Nat’l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004) (quoting Dep’t of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)).
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agencies requires that those being regulated have access to information showing
how and why rules were adopted. Particularly, transparency requires that agencies ensure that their decisions are “clearly articulated” and “the rationales for
these decisions are fully explained, and the evidence on which the decisions are
based is publicly accessible.”238
In the United States, transparency and reason-giving are embedded in a wide
variety of statutory and court-constructed principles. Regulatory agencies must,
for example, allow for public comment on proposed rules, and final rules must
be published in the Federal Register along with a separate statement providing
clear justification of agencies’ policy choices.239 Agencies also must generally
disclose information to the public upon request,240 and agencies headed by
multiple commissioners must generally make their decision-making meetings
open to the public.241 All of these requirements have applied without much
interfering with traditional administrative practices, including those in which
qualitative decision processes by humans are supplemented with conventional
quantitative techniques. By contrast, basing regulatory decisions on machine
learning might be viewed by some observers as taking a step backwards and
creating obfuscation because of learning algorithms’ complexity and black-box
nature.
How can the seemingly ineffable qualities of algorithmic analysis be squared
with principles of open government? If an agency decides to adopt a rule
because its machine-learning algorithm “said so,” will that by itself constitute
adequate justification when the functioning of the algorithm cannot be intuitively explained? This section takes up these and related questions. We conclude
that well-informed, responsible use of machine learning can be compatible with
long-established principles of accountable and transparent administrative decision making, even if some algorithmic components may be exempt from public
disclosure.
Before delving into our main argument, though, let us briefly confront
head-on any notion that the black-box nature of machine learning necessarily
condemns it as being unlawfully opaque. Although such an initial conclusion
might seem reasonable from the words “black box,” such a label is a bit of a
misnomer in this context. To say that machine learning has a black-box nature
does not mean it is completely impenetrable to human examination. Rather, as
discussed in section I.A, it means that machine-learning methods for transforming inputs to outputs are not as intuitively interpretable as more traditional
forms of data analysis.242 This is different than saying that no one can know at

238. Coglianese, Kilmartin & Mendelson, supra note 234, at 926.
239. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c).
240. See id. § 552.
241. See id. § 552(b).
242. As statistician Leo Breiman has noted, “My biostatistician friends tell me, ‘Doctors can
interpret logistic regression.’ There is no way they can interpret a black box containing fifty [classification] trees hooked together.” Breiman, supra note 42, at 209.
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all how algorithms generate their predictions, which we would agree would
undermine the transparency of any technique underlying administrative action.
Machine learning can be understood and explained. Analysts can, and do,
possess full knowledge of algorithms’ inner workings, and they can mathematically explain how these algorithms optimize their objective functions. What
they lack is simply an interpretive ability to describe this optimization in
conventional, intuitive terms. They cannot say that a machine-learning analysis
shows that X causes Y, and therefore a government agency aiming to reduce Y
needs to regulate X.
1. Reason-Giving
Legitimacy demands that agencies give adequate reasons for their actions.
With this core principle in mind, the shift in how easy it is to grasp intuitively
the results of machine-learning algorithms might seem to mark an important
qualitative change in how governmental decisions can be explained when they
are based on artificial intelligence. Given the way courts often defer to agency
expertise in cases involving complex scientific and mathematical analysis,
however, decisions that rely on machine learning are unlikely to be rejected by
the courts as insufficiently reasoned.
To be sure, administrative law has long compelled reason-giving by agency
officials, especially for rulemaking, rendering reasons a cornerstone of an
accountable and transparent government.243 The Administrative Procedure Act’s
(APA) arbitrary and capricious standard requires an agency to “articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action, including a ‘rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.’”244 In State Farm, the Court offered what
is now the canonical test for arbitrary and capricious review:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product
of agency expertise.245

To satisfy the standard of reasonableness embedded within the APA, agencies
need to explain clearly “the assumptions and methodology used in preparing the
243. See Cary Coglianese, The Transparency President? The Obama Administration and Open
Government, 22 GOVERNANCE 529, 537 (2009) (discussing the importance of reasoned transparency that,
unlike fishbowl transparency, demands explicit explanations for agency action); Jerry L. Mashaw, Small
Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 17, 19 (2001) (discussing how the legitimacy of administrative actions, unlike legislative or
judicial actions, must be grounded in reason).
244. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
245. Id.
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model” upon which they rely.246 When computers implement a model, courts
expect a reasoned explanation to ensure that “ultimate responsibility for the
policy decision remains with the agency rather than the computer.”247 Thus, in
administrative applications of machine learning, agencies will need to disclose
algorithmic specifications, including the objective function being optimized, the
method used for that optimization, and the algorithm’s input variables.
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, courts purport to give agencies’
explanations a “substantial inquiry,” one that is “thorough” and “probing.”248
Consequently, some uncertainty, especially in complex rulemakings, may always exist over whether a court will ultimately find an agency’s explanations
satisfactory, and such uncertainty may exist as well when agencies engage in
rulemaking by robot or adjudication by algorithm. Still, courts are usually
deferential to agencies’ explanations, especially when they involve complex
expert judgments. A year after State Farm, for example, the Court reviewed a
highly complex rule developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
in which the agency effectively assumed that long-term storage of radioactive
wastes would pose no environmental impact. The Court upheld the NRC action,
reasoning that “a reviewing court must remember that the Commission is
making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of
science. When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to
simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most
deferential.”249
Subsequent lower court decisions have exemplified this degree of deference
to agencies’ scientific and mathematical analyses. For example, a district court
recently noted that “[t]he most important thing to remember is that even if
plaintiffs can poke some holes in the agency’s models, that does not necessarily
preclude a conclusion that these models are the best available science. Some
degree of predictive error is inherent in the nature of mathematical modeling.”250 Similarly, another district court involved in a recent review of an

246. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Am. Pub. Gas Ass’n v. Fed.
Power Comm’n, 567 F.2d 1016, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that “the Commission is obligated to
provide a complete analytical defense of its model”).
247. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 334–35 (“The safety valves in the use of such sophisticated methodology are the requirement of public exposure of the assumptions and data incorporated into the
analysis . . . and the insistence that ultimate responsibility for the policy decision remains with the
agency rather than the computer. With these precautions the tools of econometric computer analysis can
intelligently broaden rather than constrain the policymaker’s options and avoid the ‘artificial narrowing
of options that [can be] arbitrary and capricious.’” (quoting Pillai v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 485 F.2d
1018, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (footnote omitted)).
248. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
249. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). As Adrian
Vermeule has noted, “Baltimore Gas review is in fact more consistent with Supreme Court practice in
the past three decades than is State Farm (at least in its inflated form, as ‘hard look review’).” Adrian
Vermeule, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 190 (2016); id. (noting
that “arbitrary and capricious review is thin.”).
250. Alaska v. Lubchenco, 825 F. Supp. 2d 209, 223 (D.D.C. 2011).
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agency’s conventional mathematical model noted that, “[w]hile there seems to
be a reasonable difference of opinion regarding whether the model accurately
predicted concentrations of [the chemical at issue], it is not within the purview
of this Court to weigh the evidence supporting these extremely divergent
scientific opinions and decide which of them is correct.”251 In these and other
cases of dueling arguments over complex models, agency expertise usually wins
out—and will likely continue to do so even as machine learning becomes the
more common source of agency analysis.
2. Disclosure
In addition to the need to give adequate reasons to withstand arbitrary and
capricious review, agencies confront other norms that reinforce disclosure of the
analysis underlying their decisions. Executive orders on regulatory decision
making impose principles of analysis as well as a process for the review of
significant regulations by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).252 The Information Quality Act authorizes the OMB Director to issue guidelines253 “for
ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information including statistical information disseminated by Federal agencies.”254
OMB Circular A-4 offers guidelines for conducting regulatory impact analysis
that request that agencies “clearly document all of the assumptions and methods
used in the analysis, discuss the uncertainties associate[d] with estimates, and
publicly provide the supporting data and underlying analysis.”255 Similarly,
courts have noted that, “to allow for useful criticism” in the rulemaking process,
“it is especially important for the agency to identify and make available
technical studies and data that it has employed in reaching the decisions to
propose particular rules.”256

251. Dow AgroSciences LLC v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 821 F. Supp. 2d 792, 804 (D. Md.
2011) (footnote omitted).
252. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4,
1993); Exec. Order No. 13,563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan.
21, 2011) (“[E]ach agency shall ensure the objectivity of any scientific and technological information
and processes used to support the agency’s regulatory actions.”).
253. 44 U.S.C. § 3516 (2012).
254. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8,452, 8,458 (Feb. 22,
2002). These guidelines, though, are not legally binding. See Harkonen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 800
F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the Information Quality Act does not create any legal right
to agency information or to its quality).
255. OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A PRIMER 3 (2011),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory-impactanalysis-a-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/YGZ4-JG3K]. See also 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459 (“Where appropriate, data should have full, accurate, and transparent documentation, and error sources affecting data
quality should be identified and disclosed to users.”).
256. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see
also Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating agencies must reveal
“technical studies and data” to public); Solite Corp. v. EPA, 952 F.2d 473, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same);
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These standards for disclosure of underlying data and analysis are hardly
absolute. OMB guidelines, for example, recognize that “it may often be impractical or even impermissible or unethical to apply the reproducibility standard to
[certain] data.”257 Similarly, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) permits
agencies to withhold data that constitute trade secrets or confidential business
information258 or that are collected or used for law enforcement purposes.259
These exemptions have been successfully invoked to withhold data underlying
rules,260 and agencies employing machine learning to regulate various industries could presumably also lawfully rely on them to withhold protected data.261
FOIA’s exemption for “information compiled for law enforcement purposes”
applies “only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records
or information . . . would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations
or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.”262 Law enforcement in this context includes regulatory
inspections and audits—that is, detection of administrative violations as well as
criminal ones. For agencies engaging in rulemaking via embedded machine
learning, it would be reasonable to imagine they may design an algorithm to
select a regulatory option based in part on the likelihood that regulated entities
will violate it. Accordingly, they may mathematically build into the machinelearning decision processes of simulated regulated entities a model of the choice
of whether to comply with different regulatory options. Such a mathematical
model would presumably be similar to the enforcement algorithms that an
agency would deploy after a rule’s adoption to predict noncompliance with it.
Due to this possibility of subsequently reusing, for a law enforcement purpose,
a component of an embedded machine-learning algorithm that helped design a
rule, agencies may legally seek to exempt from disclosure certain information
about relevant algorithmic specifications used in developing regulations.263
The FOIA exemption for trade secrets and confidential business information
might also apply when an agency contracts with a private company to imple-

Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating rulemaking process
cannot function with inadequate data).
257. 67 Fed. Reg. at 8456.
258. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012).
259. See id. § 552(b)(7).
260. See, e.g., Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011,
74 Fed. Reg. 14,196, 14,219 (Mar. 30, 2009) (“NHTSA cannot make public the entire contents of the
product plans. The submitted product plans contain confidential business information, which the agency
is prohibited by federal law from disclosing.”).
261. For a general discussion of the kinds of data that typically fall under FOIA’s exemptions,
especially the exemption for trade secrets and commercial information, see Critical Mass Energy
Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 872–74 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
262. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2012).
263. Even though embedded machine learning is not initially compiled for a law enforcement
purpose, these algorithms could be exempted due to the reasonable expectation that enforcement will
ultimately ensue from collection of that information. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 18 F. Supp. 2d 138,
144 (D. Mass. 1998).
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ment machine-learning analysis.264 Some of the specific methods that the
private contractor uses for optimizing agents’ objective functions in an embedded machine-learning analysis could constitute a trade secret, reflecting the
mathematical innovation produced by the firm. Of course, the objective functions themselves could still be disclosed, as they would reflect the goals of the
agency and perhaps the agency’s assumption of the goals of regulated entities.
What the private contractor working for the agency may possess expertise in,
however, is the derivation of novel mathematical methods of optimizing those
objective functions. Indeed, what made the machine-learning procedure known
as “random forests” truly innovative is not what it maximizes, but how it does
so. When this procedure is applied to predict the mean of a quantitative
variable, its objective (or loss) function is mathematically identical to that of an
ordinary least squares regression.265 But the unique methods for optimizing that
loss function result from years of research. Similar methods developed by
private firms and applied to particular governmental loss functions can easily be
repurposed to optimize other loss functions in a way that furthers the production
of a trade commodity, thereby rendering those optimization processes “information relating to the ‘productive process’ itself,”266 and thus protected from
disclosure under FOIA. If these optimization processes are withheld but
the objective functions being optimized are disclosed, it will be possible for the
public to know the “why” but not necessarily or fully the “how” of the
agencies’ underlying analyses. Rules could be adopted because the analysis
shows that their modeled consequences result in maximization of an agency’s
goals, but how exactly that maximization was computed could remain
undisclosed.
In these ways, when agencies attempt to exploit the predictive benefits of
machine learning, they may rely on methods that can protect some information
from disclosure. But these practices and the resulting limits on disclosure
associated with them are hardly unique or distinctive to machine learning, even
if arguably they might become more prevalent with the routine use of machine
learning.
Agencies would do well when using algorithms to follow good supplementary disclosure practices, even if they are not compelled to do so. One such
practice would be the disclosure of all iterations of an algorithm or alternative
algorithms that were considered, their predictions, and their corresponding
specifications (assuming that those specifications are not exempt from disclosure). The end goal of an algorithm is accurate prediction via optimization of an
objective function; determining which algorithm and specifications yield the
most accurate predictions is often a matter of trial and error. Various algorithms
264. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012).
265. See BERK, supra note 33, at 193–203.
266. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 244 F.3d 144, 150–51 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); see
also Appleton v. FDA, 451 F. Supp. 2d 129, 142–44 (D.D.C. 2006).
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perform differently in data sets, and a whole host of factors can affect their
accuracy, including how many times an algorithm is run before compiling
results from all runs, what variables are included in the algorithm, and other
tuning parameters that vary depending on the algorithm. In other words, the
road to a final algorithm is paved with many others whose results ultimately
inform properties of the final algorithm. Disclosing the earlier runs would be
advisable because they would indicate that the ultimate methodology was
chosen wisely and with consideration of possible alternatives.267 Volunteering
how those previous algorithms were specified and tuned should not reveal
information that needs to be exempted from disclosure, and yet it would give
some insights into agencies’ deliberative processes. Perhaps more importantly, it
would signal the adoption of “a presumption in favor of disclosure” that
exemplifies good governmental practice.268
Agencies could also generate and release additional forms of algorithmic
output that reveal information about the structural properties of data sets and the
relationships among variables without disclosing exempted information. Such
outputs might include, for example, “partial dependence plots,” which reveal
the functional forms of relationships (albeit with no implication of causality)
between predictor variables and the outcome variable, as well as “predictor
importance plots,” which indicate, roughly speaking, how important each predictor variable is for resulting predictions.269 Such plots are tangential to the metric
that is key to policymaking based on algorithms—predictive accuracy—and
thus they are not likely to factor into rules in any dispositive way that would
make them legally subject to disclosure. But they can offer supplementary
commentary that would further transparency by allowing interested parties to
accrue some knowledge of information contained in withheld data sets or
algorithms. Perhaps more importantly, output such as partial dependence plots270
might provide some more intuitive explanations as to why an algorithm’s
predictions resulted, which may be valuable to courts or members of the public
accustomed to decisions based on causal reasoning.271

267. There may be instances where this developmental information must be disclosed. See, e.g., Am.
Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that redacted studies on
which the FCC relied must be disclosed because “there is no APA precedent allowing an agency to
cherry-pick a study on which it has chosen to rely in part”). If, on the other hand, supplementary
information from which conclusions are not drawn merely “clarif[ies], expand[s], or amend[s] other
data that has been offered for comment,” then such information may be withheld. Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 900, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Thus, whether previous algorithm runs
would legally need to be disclosed will depend on their role in a particular proceeding.
268. See Presidential Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 26, 2009).
269. See BERK, supra note 33, at 236–49.
270. See Cutler et al., supra note 211, and accompanying text.
271. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 8, at 65 (“In our daily lives, we think so often in
causal terms that we may believe causality can easily be shown. The truth is much less comfortable.”).
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Ultimately, transparency in administrative rulemaking is essential to avoid
the creation of “secret law”272 and to “ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to
hold the governors accountable to the governed.”273 When regulations are made
based on algorithmic predictions, transparency of decision making requires as
much disclosure about the algorithm’s specifications and its underlying data as
possible.274 However, as noted, FOIA may often allow the withholding of some
data on commercial confidentiality or related grounds, rendering complete
reproducibility of results difficult. But, if algorithmic specifications can be
disclosed so as to make results at least theoretically reproducible, then
the fundamental goal of knowing how and why decisions resulted might be
satisfied. Of course, those specifications themselves, in particular the mathematical optimization processes used in a machine-learning analysis, could be exempted from disclosure as well if they support law enforcement or are developed
by private contractors. But these are all legally permissible exemptions that
have been invoked by agencies time and again outside the context of algorithmic regulation. As agencies move into the era of machine learning, they may
continue to avail themselves of these same exemptions but would still be
required or at least advised to release an appropriate amount of information to
illuminate what may initially seem to be an opaque analytical process and
satisfy prevailing norms of open government. In these ways, agencies will also
be able to justify their actions with sufficient reasons to withstand charges that
agencies have acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
III. THE MERITS OF MACHINE LEARNING IN THE REGULATORY STATE
The legal analysis presented in the previous Part indicates that when federal
agencies use artificial intelligence to automate regulatory and adjudicatory
decisions, they will likely face little difficulty in making machine-learning
practices fit within existing administrative and constitutional constraints.275 This
analysis has taken place against a backdrop of growing concern over the
proliferation of machine learning and artificial intelligence, which may make
our conclusions surprising, if not a bit disquieting, to some readers. After all, as
we noted at the outset of this Article, technologists and sociologists alike worry
272. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138 (1975).
273. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
274. As discussed infra Section I.C, these algorithms may be embedded or tied together in
overarching computer programs that translate predictions into administrative actions. Forthcoming
research suggests that optimal transparency and accountability may also require that agencies publish
cryptographic commitments of these programs to demonstrate the regularity of their decision making.
See Kroll et al., supra note 1, at 18–21.
275. In other words, we suggest that the administrative use of machine learning will be unexceptional from a legal perspective; it will not necessitate any “systemic change to laws or legal institutions
in order to preserve or rebalance established values.” Calo, supra note 120, at 553. Interestingly, Calo
describes how robotics may possess a moderate level of exceptionalism in other legal domains, such as
criminal and tort law. Id. at 552–55.
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about the consequences of algorithmic automation spreading throughout society,
bringing with it the possibility that highly-skilled jobs will be taken over by
machines276 as super-intelligent computers surpass the capacities of humans.277
These anxieties will undoubtedly grow only more fevered when artificial intelligence falls into the hands of government officials, such as when it is used in
predictive policing278 or, in what has been called “the crossing of a moral
Rubicon,” in target-selecting military drones.279 If the significant governmental
power wielded by administrative agencies could also be taken over by autonomous algorithms, then surely society would face a grave specter of lives and
livelihoods being regulated by robots.
Notwithstanding these ominous warnings, actual technological capabilities
are hardly so threatening. For much the same reason that science alone can
never “make” policy decisions,280 machine-learning algorithms need humans to
specify their objective functions and construct the mathematical processes that
will maximize them.281 Although machine learning could replace or supplement
many routine governmental tasks, the oversight and direction of the government
will remain in human hands even in the machine-learning era. Society’s
most consequential regulatory decisions are not routine and therefore will
almost surely prove to be unsuitable candidates for automation; these most
significant regulatory policy decisions present complexities, uncertainties, and
value judgments that will resist the kind of specification needed to embed them
in mathematical objective functions. Machine-learning analysis will be able to
assist only by informing the most significant of regulatory choices, not by
determining them.282 The more routine decisions that algorithms will be able to

276. See, e.g., Timothy Aeppel, What Clever Robots Mean for Jobs, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2015,
10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-clever-robots-mean-for-jobs-1424835002 [https://perma.
cc/E8JJ-VB6Y]; Claire Cain Miller, Can an Algorithm Hire Better Than a Human?, N.Y. TIMES (June
25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/upshot/can-an-algorithm-hire-better-than-a-human.html
[https://perma.cc/N6QZ-AD55]; Zeynep Tufekci, The Machines Are Coming, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/opinion/sunday/the-machines-are-coming.html [https://perma.
cc/7WY5-ENV6].
277. See, e.g., Peter Holley, Apple Co-Founder on Artificial Intelligence: ‘The Future Is Scary and
Very Bad for People,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/
wp/2015/03/24/apple-co-founder-on-artificial-intelligence-the-future-is-scary-and-very-bad-for-people
[https://perma.cc/8ATY-TZK3].
278. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 8, at 158–62; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra
note 179, at 673; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 119, at 103–05; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data
and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 329–30 (2015); Ferguson, supra note 16
(manuscript at 3).
279. Robert H. Latiff & Patrick J. McCloskey, With Drone Warfare, America Approaches the
Robo-Rubicon, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2013, 7:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788
7324128504578346333246145590 [https://perma.cc/MV88-F9BQ].
280. See Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk
Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1257–58 (2004).
281. See supra Section I.B.
282. Sometimes the use of benefit–cost analysis by administrative agencies has been resisted out of
concern that it will substitute mechanistically for human judgment. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling,
Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2070 (1998) (arguing that numbers “[a]t
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make will surely affect people’s lives and livelihoods, but in these cases
machine-learning applications will be designed to meet human officials’ specifications and will ultimately remain under human control. Autonomous robots
will not be wielding regulatory power on their own.
For the reasons we have explained, nothing about algorithms makes them
uniquely or automatically unsuitable for use by administrative agencies in terms
of their ability to comport with core legal principles. Although machine-learning
systems can fit quite comfortably within existing constitutional and administrative law, this does not mean that their use will always be warranted.283 It
especially does not mean that agencies should use machine learning in a
haphazard or irresponsible manner. Agencies will have to act with care and, in
designing and implementing their algorithms, consider potential pitfalls and
areas of concern. In the following two sections, we briefly discuss how several
key policy issues and good government principles apply to machine learning
applications. The policy issues relate to the four legal doctrines discussed
earlier: nondelegation, due process, antidiscrimination, and transparency. The
other principles of good government apply more generally to the exploitation of
algorithms by those in positions of power. Only by engaging in a thorough,
case-by-case evaluation of such non-binding but vital considerations will agencies ensure that their use of machine learning conforms not just to the law but
also to foundational principles of sound and legitimate public policy.
A. RELATED PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS

In the previous Part, we demonstrated that, in principle, agencies’ machinelearning algorithms should withstand legal challenges based on doctrines of
nondelegation, due process, antidiscrimination, and transparency. Of course, an
escape from judicial censure does not necessarily guarantee that the algorithms
will be fully consonant with the public policy principles underlying those
doctrines. Some of the policy concerns animating the legal doctrines discussed

worst” can “derail thoughtful discussion by offering the illusion of objective accuracy”). But even
economists recognize that benefit–cost analysis can never fully determine a policy decision. See, e.g.,
Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety
Regulation?, 272 SCI. 221, 221 (1996) (acknowledging that “benefit–cost analysis has a potentially
important role to play in helping inform regulatory decision-making, although it should not be the sole
basis for such decision-making”); John J. Donohue III, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those
Who Discount Discounting, 108 YALE L.J. 1901, 1910 (1999) (noting that no one should “be a slave to
such an analysis”).
283. Nor will the use of machine learning always be easy. Although we have discussed how the need
for specified objective functions will be more likely to produce legislation that assuages legal concerns
over nondelegation, and how the same need for goal precision can mitigate concerns based on
antidiscrimination and transparency principles, it may often be more difficult in practice for decision
makers to agree on how to specify the objectives of administrative algorithms. As Justice Cuéllar has
noted, these difficulties may arise frequently “because agreement at a high level of generality rarely
translates into consensus on how to implement policies through administrative agencies.” Cuéllar,
supra note 25, at 16.
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in Part II still deserve attention if agencies are to use machine learning in a
responsible manner.
For instance, we noted that one of the nondelegation doctrine’s motivating
goals—ensuring political accountability—has prompted some scholars to advocate that the courts should give more deference when an agency head makes the
key decision than when decisions are made by subordinate officials.284 The
courts have not embraced such a graduated approach, but its suggestion should
prompt agency officials to consider how machine learning may affect the locus
of decision making inside their agencies. When rules are intimately tied to the
outputs of an algorithm, the programming of that algorithm will be a consequential task—one that presumably should not be assigned exclusively to a lowerlevel analyst, as traditional statistical analyses may be today. Assigning
responsibility to lower-level analysts without adequate input and oversight
could run the risk that higher-level officials—those who are more directly
accountable to the political branches of government and to the public—will not
fully understand critical details about an already ostensibly opaque rulemaking
process. Perhaps worse, the lower-level analysts could make choices about an
algorithm’s specifications and tuning without realizing potentially far-reaching
impacts of their decisions.285 For these reasons, agencies should be mindful of
who within an agency actually wields algorithm-specifying power and how well
high-level officials understand the methods of regulating by robot or adjudicating by algorithm.
Our discussion of due process similarly suggests that there is no reason to
view adjudicatory algorithms as uniquely threatening to fair hearings. Still,
agencies will need to proceed thoughtfully and with care.286 Agencies may need
to delay the deployment of their algorithms to get a sense of how well the
test-data error rates correspond with decision reversal rates—the metric underlying the existing body of relevant case law. Furthermore, agencies should
increasingly seek out and engage neutral statistical experts to provide dispassionate assessments of consequential uses of algorithms. Individuals challenging an
agency’s deprivation of their rights or property cannot be expected to mount a
sufficiently probing search for an algorithm’s potential inadequacies and biases,
either on their own or with the help of skilled, but mathematically naı̈ve,
counsel. Even if not legally required, agencies should still undertake the kind of
probing inquiry needed to minimize possible errors and biases associated with
any algorithms they use.

284. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
285. In calling for increased artificial intelligence expertise in government, a recent report from
Stanford notes that “insufficiently trained officials may simply take the word of industry technologists
and green light a sensitive application [of artificial intelligence] that has not been adequately vetted.”
PETER STONE ET AL., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030, at 43 (2016), https://ai100.stanford.edu/
sites/default/files/ai_100_report_0901fnlb.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HPP-72XZ].
286. See supra Section II.B.
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Agencies must also take note of the potential for their algorithms to cause a
disproportionate impact on members of certain classes or groups, despite the
probable constitutionality under the Fifth Amendment of the use of such
algorithms.287 Of all the policy concerns related to the legal doctrines discussed
in this Article, the possibility of disproportionate impacts may be the most
acute. In the popular and academic media, commentators have noted the ways
in which algorithmic bias can manifest itself.288 A series of violent interactions
between police and African-Americans over the last few years has prompted
public worry of pervasive discrimination by governmental authorities.289 Agencies should thus seek ways of mitigating algorithms’ disparate impact. But they
should do so not just as a response to this public alarm, but also as a matter of
ethical governance. If discrimination, no matter how unintentional, can be
avoided, it should be. Recent advances in statistics, as noted earlier, may
provide agencies with powerful mitigating tools, but agencies will still need to
balance tradeoffs with forecasting accuracy.290
Finally, we have shown that agencies should have no problem disclosing
sufficient information to meet the reason-giving and transparency requirements
of the APA and FOIA.291 Nevertheless, disclosing the bare minimum—probably
just the objective functions and limited aspects of algorithms’ specifications—
should not be the ultimate goal of an open, forthcoming administrative state.
Agencies should begin developing practices for documenting, retaining, and
disclosing developmental algorithm specifications and final algorithm supplemental output to increase transparency and facilitate peer review.292
B. OTHER GOOD GOVERNMENT PRINCIPLES

In addition to policy concerns related to the four legal doctrines analyzed in
Part II, several other good government principles should be considered by
agencies when using machine learning. These principles relate to challenges
associated with quantification, permissible error, lack of empathy, job losses,
and privacy.

287. See supra Section II.C.
288. See e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 179; Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at
Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Angwin et al., supra note 232; Kate Crawford,
Opinion, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guy-problem.html [https://perma.cc/
RCH6-MUKF]; Noyes, supra note 180; Schrage, supra note 180.
289. See generally Niraj Chokshi, How #BlackLivesMatter Came to Define a Movement, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/us/how-blacklivesmatter-came-to-define-amovement.html [https://perma.cc/34W8-GNRK] (chronicling the development of the Black Lives
Matter movement in response to police violence).
290. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
291. See supra Section II.D.
292. See supra Section II.D. Note that OMB guidelines have stated that technical methodology
subjected to peer review can be presumed to be sufficiently objective. See Guidelines for Ensuring and
Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal
Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 8,452 (Feb. 22, 2002).
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First, agencies should recognize that the use of algorithms will often compel
agency decision makers to engage in quantitative coding of value judgments
that have typically been made qualitatively. For example, machine-learning
algorithms often permit the specification of their “cost” ratios—the ratio of false
positives to false negatives.293 This is a concrete, unambiguous quantification of
agencies’ relative normative values of their errors. For agencies not accustomed
to making moral valuations through any kind of formal process, let alone one
that assigns them numbers, machine-learning algorithms will necessitate addressing questions of organizational and democratic decision making. Who should
have the power to transform qualitative moral judgments into a cost ratio?
Should agencies involve the public or at least make interested parties aware of a
transformation from qualitative to a quantitative assessment of errors and
algorithmic tradeoffs? Is such a transformation even possible, or are human
deliberations over morality too nuanced to be reduced to a matrix of error
rates?294 Agencies will have to confront not only the challenges of making
accurate quantifications of error rates but also contend with a host of relevant
normative questions about quantification as they proceed into the machinelearning era.
Second, agencies will have to decide what constitutes “acceptable” algorithmic error rates. This will go beyond the due process-related assessment of
whether courts will consider algorithm error rates acceptable. Instead, it requires agencies to ask how large gains in accuracy must be to offset other
difficulties in implementing algorithmic systems. Such issues would likely arise
in the context of benefit–cost analyses that agencies conduct prior to taking
important actions. For example, how much would, say, a five percent increase in
accuracy when predicting hazardous waste pipeline incidents save an agency
in inspection costs? Would these savings be worth the necessary investments in
human capital and data infrastructure? And, beyond the internal difficulties
faced by agencies, would the public demand particularly large increases in
accuracy to compensate for the novelty, and potentially alarming nature, of
robotic systems of regulation or adjudication?295 Is a marginal improvement
over the status quo acceptable, or should agencies strive for something more?

293. See supra note 172.
294. The difficulties of programming morality into artificially intelligent systems has been discussed
previously, such as in the context of the choice of autonomous cars about which humans to harm when
faced with scenarios inevitably resulting in some human casualties. See, e.g., John Markoff, Should
Your Driverless Car Hit a Pedestrian to Save Your Life?, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/06/24/technology/should-your-driverless-car-hit-a-pedestrian-to-save-your-life.html [https://
perma.cc/PL2N-R7GR].
295. Governmental use of machine learning could create a “Tesla effect,” of sorts. The Tesla effect
refers to the principle that, even though driverless cars may be statistically far safer than manned ones,
widespread alarm results when even a few individuals become victims of accidents involving a Tesla
operating autonomously. Cf. Larry Greenemeier, Deadly Tesla Crash Exposes Confusion over Automated Driving, SCI. AM. (July 8, 2016), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/deadly-tesla-crashexposes-confusion-over-automated-driving [https://perma.cc/72C4-T33P] (discussing both self-
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Third, we should consider what happens to human contact in a world of
robotic regulators and algorithmic adjudicators. Citizens expect their government to be competent and efficient, but they also tend to view governmental
institutions as more legitimate when these institutions operate with understanding and empathy.296 The idea of the government reducing individuals to data
points that are then fed into an algorithm will seem disconcertingly impersonal—
even if ultimately more accurate and efficient. Administrative officials that use
algorithms should seek to listen to interested members of the public as they
design systems for rulemaking by robot or adjudicating by algorithm. These
officials should also encourage participation through interactive methods that
treat beneficiaries, targets of regulation, and all other affected parties with
respect and dignity.297
Fourth, government should not turn a blind eye to the possibility that
widespread use of algorithms will put many government workers out of their
jobs.298 The extent to which agencies’ workforces will shrink as a result of
adopting machine learning is unclear; as we have noted, human input will still
be necessary at many steps of regulatory and adjudicatory processes, even when
automated.299 But there can be little doubt that the structures of agencies’
workforces will change if day-to-day operations begin to take drastically different forms due to automated decision making. With over 1.8 million full-time

driving’s safety features and the collective apprehension after a fatal accident involving a self-driving
car).
296. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
CRIME & JUSTICE 283 (2003).
297. See CARY COGLIANESE, LISTENING, LEARNING, LEADING: A FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY EXCELLENCE 9 (2015), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4946-pprfinalconvenersreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F89X-SGHB] (describing “empathic engagement” as a core attribute of regulatory excellence); Cary
Coglianese, Regulatory Excellence as “People Excellence,” REGBLOG (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.
regblog.org/2015/10/23/coglianese-people-excellence/ [https://perma.cc/7AND-FB8K] (“[R]egulatory excellence demands the consistent achievement of three fundamental attributes: utmost integrity, empathic
engagement, and stellar competence.” (emphasis in original)). It may even be worthwhile for agencies
to consider ways of developing online, anthropomorphic representations as part of a human–computer
interface to encourage more empathic and emotionally positive interactions between citizens and their
increasingly robotic regulators. Cf. Kate Darling, “Who’s Johnny?”: Anthropomorphic Framing in
Human-Robot Interaction, Integration, and Policy, in ROBOT ETHICS 2.0 (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.
com/abstract⫽2588669 [https://perma.cc/66PQ-6U85] (recognizing concerns around framing robotic
technology in human terms but noting the benefits of anthropomorphizing robots); Will Davies, Robot
Amelia—A Glimpse of the Future for Local Government, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2016, 2:10 AM), https://www.
theguardian.com/public-leaders-network/2016/jul/04/robot-amelia-future-local-government-enfieldcouncil [https://perma.cc/EZG3-GXCF] (describing how a London borough has begun responding to
citizen requests, such as for permits, using a voice response system that employs natural language
processing to interpret emotions in citizens’ voices and respond appropriately and empathetically);
Adriana Hamacher et al., Believing in BERT: Using Expressive Communication to Enhance Trust and
Counteract Operational Error in Physical Human-Robot Interaction, Presented at the IEEE International
Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication (2016), http://arxiv.org/abs/1605.08817
[https://perma.cc/PV72-UZFM] (describing how robots with affective interaction styles recover more
of humans’ trust after they make errors than robots that are more efficient yet impersonal).
298. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
299. See supra Section I.C.
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employees in the executive branch of the federal government,300 and many
more working for government contractors, large-scale automation efforts may
be appropriately combined with proactive job training for workers who might
seek positions in the future in algorithm-support responsibilities.
Finally, although throughout this Article we have self-consciously eschewed
a discussion of privacy concerns, for reasons noted earlier,301 agencies still must
never overlook these concerns. Administrative agencies are poised to collect
more data on individuals with each passing day. Agencies must properly and
securely store these data to minimize threats to privacy intrusions, especially
when many administrative applications of machine learning will require interagency sharing through the cloud.302 Agencies may also increasingly seek
individuals’ data from sources outside of the United States, which will require
careful consideration of jurisdictional questions.303
C. A PATH FORWARD

The issues we have raised in the preceding two sections should be addressed
as part of agencies’ case-by-case assessments and benefit–cost analyses of
specific applications of machine learning. Agency and cross-agency decisions
about when and how to implement machine learning will benefit from clear
guidance on how to assess machine learning’s merits.304 The Administrative
Conference of the United States, the National Academy of Public Administration, or the National Academy of Sciences might be able to help in developing
guidelines. When agencies ultimately apply such guidelines and conduct benefit–
cost analysis of specific machine learning applications, we can expect administrative algorithms will prove extremely promising in some instances and less
advantageous in others.305 Agencies should be suitably discerning and pursue

300. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., SIZING UP THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 5 (2016),
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employment-reports/
reports-publications/sizing-up-the-executive-branch-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FGX-2B4H].
301. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
302. Cf. Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1623, 1661–62
(2013) (considering United States and European Union definitions of “personal information” and
suggesting regulatory reforms for cloud storage to ensure “strong and effective protections for information privacy”).
303. Cf. Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 731 (2016)
(discussing competing conceptions of the territoriality of personal data).
304. This kind of ethical oversight has also been called for in recent considerations of a future
medical profession driven substantially by machine learning. See Alison M. Darcy et al., Opinion,
Machine Learning and the Profession of Medicine, 315 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 551, 551 (2016) (“The
profession of medicine has a tremendous opportunity and an obligation to oversee the application of
this [machine-learning] technology to patient care.”).
305. There may also be instances in which pursuing machine learning is advantageous and worthwhile only when human intuition can be incorporated into algorithms. Cf. Jens Jakob W. H. Sørensen et
al., Exploring the Quantum Speed Limit with Computer Games, 532 NATURE 210, 213 (2016) (describing how addressing key technical issues facing quantum computing may be facilitated by incorporating
the results of human intuition, gleaned from computer games simulating atomic movement, into
machine-learning algorithms).
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machine learning applications when they can lead to meaningful improvements
in procedural and substantive outcomes.
Recognition of the need for careful consideration and reasonable safeguards
when agencies use algorithms should not lead to any presumption against using
machine learning entirely. These techniques are becoming ubiquitous in private
industry for good reason; their ability to make accurate predictions of complex
phenomena can render decision making vastly more effective and efficient, and
it would be wise for administrative agencies also to seek these benefits.306 Still,
accountable managers must carefully oversee their use of algorithms, even in
the private sector,307 and they must take possible unintended consequences into
account.308 The same can be said of all innovative practices. The need to weigh
the pros and cons of algorithms is in no way qualitatively different than the
weighing of benefits and costs needed to inform other administrative choices,309
including those prompted by other technological advancements.310 Thoughtful
implementation is always advisable for the adoption of any new administrative
technology or process.
Deciding how and when to use machine learning may not come easily, which
may make agency efforts to facilitate public participation in decisions about the
use of machine learning even more important. It would certainly be better to
take additional time to engage in robust public consultation and make thoughtful decisions about machine learning’s use than to dismiss algorithms out of
hand over exaggerated fears about unleashing artificial intelligence “demons.”311 Technological and analytical advances are continually invented and
adopted because, despite their potential limitations, they offer the possibility to
transform society for the better. The implementation of machine-learning algo306. Coglianese, supra note 22.
307. See Michael Luca, Jon Kleinberg & Sendhil Mullainathan, Algorithms Need Managers, Too, 94
HARV. BUS. REV. 96 (Jan.–Feb. 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/01/algorithms-need-managers-too [https://
perma.cc/7YAB-MK4S].
308. Cf. Gökçe Sargut & Rita McGrath, Learning to Live with Complexity, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.
2011), https://hbr.org/2011/09/learning-to-live-with-complexity [https://perma.cc/94HV-65PW] (describing the management techniques required to oversee complex, data-driven systems); Latanya Sweeney,
Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 56 COMMC’NS ACM 44, 53 (2013) (describing Google’s need to
contend with differential delivery of advertisements for arrest records when individuals search for
names typically associated with different races). Algorithms applied in administrative contexts will face
the same possible risks of bounded cognition that can accompany well-accepted, performance-based
regulatory standards because objective functions will be defined in terms of desired outcomes. See Cary
Coglianese, Performance-Based Regulation: Concepts and Challenges, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND
REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL REGULATORY PROCESS 403 (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring
eds., 2016).
309. Cf. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959)
(discussing the complexity of the mosaic nature of traditional administrative decision making).
310. The Internet, for example, has vastly expanded the ways in which administrative agencies can
communicate with the public in rulemaking, but taking advantage of these opportunities still requires
careful consideration of factors such as how to make information equally accessible to all members of
the public. See Cary Coglianese, Enhancing Public Access to Online Rulemaking Information, 2 MICH.
J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 39–40 (2012).
311. Cf. Gibbs, supra note 11.
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rithms by administrative agencies certainly possesses such potential. With
proper forethought and care guided by the kind of analysis we have provided
throughout this Article, an administrative state on the cutting edge of statistical
innovation can be legally and responsibly realized. Moving in this direction can
deliver marked improvements in overall well-being, especially as the government faces new challenges in overseeing a private sector that has already
entered the machine-learning era.
CONCLUSION
We have considered a future American administrative state increasingly
driven by machine-learning algorithms. Such a future may not look like the
glamorously—or ominously—automated picture painted by popular media coverage of artificial intelligence, but it nonetheless could entail significant changes
in how the government functions, whether in making certain rules or in applying and enforcing them. Administrative agencies have begun to take steps
toward such a future, and our analysis offers support to agencies that seek to
venture further into this new era of administration. Agencies that rely on
machine-learning algorithms are unlikely to face unique, insurmountable legal
barriers, at least not under the key legal principles of the administrative state
that we have assessed here. By establishing the legality of the use of machine
learning, we believe our analysis clears away one of the more significant
hurdles to its further implementation. Of course, although our legal analysis
supports agency use of machine learning, we recognize that agencies will need,
as with any management or policy choice, to exercise care in how and when
they deploy new technology and will need to build the human capital and
information technology infrastructure to support rulemaking by robot and adjudication by algorithm.312 To admit the need for such diligence in execution,
however, is no reason for preemptively shying away from the benefits from
government agencies’ deployment of the latest statistical advancements.
If agencies encounter public hesitancy about governmental use of artificial
intelligence, perhaps that anxiety will stem from a perception of machinelearning algorithms as fundamentally different in kind from existing decisionmaking processes. Something about the phrase “black box”—a common
description of machine learning techniques—may make machine learning sound
incompatible with notions of accountable government. But it would be more
accurate to view machine-learning algorithms, or any other statistical procedures, not as complete black boxes, but rather as extensions of existing human
decision making. After all, human cognition and computerized algorithms may
process information in certain foundationally similar ways.313 The latter are

312. Coglianese, supra note 22.
313. See Brenden M. Lake et al., Human-Level Concept Learning Through Probabilistic Program
Induction, 350 SCIENCE 1332 (2015) (suggesting that the brain–computer analogy could profitably guide
research); Gary Marcus, Face It, Your Brain Is a Computer, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), http://www.
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black box in nature simply because they are, qualitatively speaking, more
complex and less intuitively understandable than conventional techniques, perhaps also much like human decision making. Democratic government itself, in a
collective sense, is decision making according to the algorithm of majority rule.
The Constitution’s establishment of a bicameral legislature and a system of
checks and balances established a complex decision-making algorithm involving hundreds of officials elected by millions of voters. With the passage of time,
Congress, presidents, and agencies have imposed their own layers of procedures
for their work that are arguably as complex and counterintuitive as any machinelearning algorithm.314 Just as some messiness and ineffability in collective
decision making may be the price of the benefits of democracy, difficulty
intuiting machine-learning results may be a relatively small price to pay for
more accurate and effective decisions in the administrative state.
With the advent of artificial intelligence’s widespread application throughout
all other realms of society, it will not be long before the administrative state
moves headlong to confront the questions we have analyzed in this Article. For
administrative agencies, what will distinguish the machine-learning era is not a
substitution of human judgment with some foreign and unfamiliar methodology,
but rather an evolution of human judgment to incorporate fundamentally similar—albeit more accurate and often practically more useful—processes of
decision making made possible by advances in statistical knowledge, data
storage, and digital computing. The analysis offered here provides an antidote to
visceral reactions against the use of artificial intelligence in the public sector,
reactions we hope will give way to a measured optimism capable of guiding and
improving the future of the administrative state.

nytimes.com/2015/06/28/opinion/sunday/face-it-your-brain-is-a-computer.html [https://perma.cc/6S4BPENT].
314. Governmental decision-making processes have grown neither more straightforward nor less
opaque since Bismarck’s famous quip about the similarities between lawmaking and sausage making.

